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REPORT  ON 
MONITORING  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  COMMON  FISHERIES  POLICY 
The  common  fisheries  policy,  which,  for  economic  reasons,  is  intended  to 
manage  rationally  a  resource which  is  a  common  heritage,  necessarily involves 
the application of rules.  Fishermen are subject to binding community rules in 
that  they  may  flab  only  for  certain  species,  in  certain  areas,  at  certain 
times  of the year,  with certain types  of  gear  and within certain quantitative 
limits. 
Any  fisherman  failing  to  comply  with  the  rules  acta  in  infringement  of  the 
rights  of  his  fellow  fishermen  and  against  the  common  heritage.  It  is 
therefore  crucial  for  fishermen••  activities  to  be  efficiently  monitored. 
This  is vital to the  success of the common  fisheries policy. 
1.  Basic  principles  of  the  organization  of  fisheries  surveillance  in  the 
Community 
1.1  General 
conservation  of  fishery  resources  is  subject  to  rules  adopted  at  CoJIIJllunity 
level.  When  these  were  first adopted,  the  question  arose  as  to whether,  and 
to what  extent,  the monitoring of  fishing  should  be  entrusted to the national 
authorities. 
The  following factors  had to be  taken into account: 
the  legal means  (e.g.  penalties)  and  material resources at the  disposal of 
the  national  authorities  differ  from  one  country  to  another  and  this  may 
entail differences  in  the way  fishing  activities  are monitored  and  in  the 
prosecution of  infringements~ 
each  Member  state  monitoring  fisheries  in  its  waters  may  tend  to 
discriminate  between  ita  own  fishermen  and  those  of  other  community 
countries or non-member  countries. 
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Against  this  background,  the  idea  of  a  European  team  of  fishery  inspectors 
seamed  fairly  attractive  but  the  following  points  had  to  be  taken  into 
consideration: 
a~oat all the member  countries already had  fishery inspection servicesi 
these  services  exercise  sovereign  rights,  including  the  right  to  apply 
penalties; 
centralized services,  especially for  an  area  as vast as  the  community,  are 
difficult to organize  and manage. 
consequently,  the  solution  adopted  by  the  community  in  the  context  of  the 
common  fisheries  policy was  that monitoring would be  the responsibility of the 
Member  states,  but would be  subject to checks  by  the commission. 
1.2  Basic legislation 
Under  the  basic  Regulation  on  fisheries  control,  adopted  by  the  council  on 
2  June  1982,  consolidated  in  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2241/871  and  amended  by 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3483/88:2 
as  a  basic  principle,  it is the  prime  responsibility  of  each  Member  State 
to monitor  fishing  in its maritime  waters  as  well  as  in ita territory,  and 
related activities  by  all fishing vessels,  including  those  from  non-member 
countries;  in  order  to  ensure  an  inspection  service  as  efficient  and 
economical  as  possible,  the  Member  States  should  co-ordonate their control 
activities; 
the  Commission  has  the  power  to  carry  out  checks,  at  aea  and  in  fishing 
ports,  on  monitoring  by  national  authorities  of  the  application  of  the 
common  policy  on  conservation,  including  rules  on  the  TAC  system  and 
quotas,  technical conservation measures,  fishing agreements with  non-member 
countries and  international conventions. 
1  OJ  No  L  207,  29.7.1987,  p.  1. 
2  OJ  No  L  306,  11.11.1988,  p.  2. 
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The  commission  also  has  the  power  to  seek  information  from  the 
Member  states  regarding  implementation  of  the  regulation  and,  where 
irregularities are  suspected,  to require  national authorities to carry out 
adminiatrative  investigations  with  the  participation  of  Commi ..  ion 
officials~ 
the uptake of TACa  and quotaa is subject to a  monitoring system under which 
fishermen  are  obliged,  while  they  are  at  sea,  to  record  in  a  Community 
logbook,  at  least  daily,  the  area  in  which  they  are  fishing  and  the 
quantities caught and then to declare the exact quantities landed. 
It  should  be  noted  that  community  control  measures,  in  particular  the 
obligation  to  record  catches,  apply  to  all  stocks  subject  to  quantity 
restrictions  (TACs  or  quotas),  without  regard  to  where  the  catch  is  made, 
whether it is made  in international waters,1 or in third country waters. 
The  Member  states  are  under  an  obligation to halt  fishing  as  soon  as  a  quota 
is used  up.  The  commission  confirms  the  decision by  a  Regulation  which  makes 
this  ban  obligatory  throughout  the  Community  so  that  the  other  Member  states 
can  check  that the  cessation of  fishing is complied with;  the  commission  too, 
acting  on  its  own  initiative  and  on  the  basis  of  information  available,  may 
close a  fishery when  a  quota or TAC  is used up. 
The  legislation on control arrangements  in community waters  has  gradually made 
more  stringent,  on  the  commission's  initiative and  with  Parliament's  support. 
Although  the  basic  principle  of  subsidiarity,  i.e.  decentralization  to 
Member  state  level,  remains  intact,  the  Commission's  monitoring  powers  have 
increased,  particularly as regards the stopping of fishing on the basis of its 
own  information -Article 11(3)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  2241/87. 
1  case c-258/89  commission  v  spain. 
./. -' -
Furthermore,  in  the  management  of  catch  quotas,  the  commission  has  been 
entrusted  with  implementing  a  new  procedure  (subject  to  consultation  of  the 
Management  committee)  for compensating damages  suffered by  fishermen who,  when 
a  fishery  is  closed  as  a  result  of  complete  uptake  of  a  TAC,  have  not  bean 
able to fish their full quota because of overfiahing by  another Member  state. 
Finaly,  the  control  iD  respect  of  quotas  is  the  joint  reponsibility  of  the 
Member  states,  in  particular  the  vessels  • flag  state,  and  the  Member  state 
where  landings  are made. 
1.3  Financial solidarity 
The  decentralization  to  Member  state  level  of  responsibility  for  fisheries 
surveillance  was  accompanied,  from  the  start,  by  measures  to  share  the 
attendant  costs.  These  costs  differ  substantially  frOID  one  Member  state  to 
another  because  of  differences  in  economic  situation  and  in  the  extent  of 
areas  to  be  monitored.  The  first move  towards  cost  sharing  was  made  in  1978 
to  help  Ireland  and  Denmark  (Greenland),!  after which  contributions to assist 
all  the  Member  states  were  agreed  in  1987  (ECU  22  million)2  and  1989 
(ECU  110 million  over  five  yeara)3  to  develop  monitoring  systems  in  the 
Member  states.  The  latest  decision  also  covers  surveillance  in  the 
Mediterranean. 
The  allocation of financial contributions to the various  Member  states for the 
development of surveillance is  shown  in Annex  I  (Tables  I  and II). 
2.  PRACTICAL  ORGANIZATION 
2.1  National inspectorate& 
2.1.1 organization 
Each  Member  state organizes  the surveillance arrangements  in its territory and 
in  its waters,  with  the  means  at its disposal.  Under  the  convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  sea,  it  also  has  the  right  to  monitor  ita  own  vessels  in 
international waters. 
1  council Decision  78/640/EEC. 
2  council Decisions  87/278/EEC  and  87/279/EEC. 
3  council Decision  89/631/EEC. 
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systems  of organization differ considerably  from  one  Member  state to another. 
some  have  inspection services  dedicated specifically to  fisheries  activitiesr 
others  call  on  several  different  government  departments  which  also  perform 
functions other than fisheries  surveillance. 
The  results  range  from  a  comparath~ely  well-organized  service  using  well-
qualified staff in  some  areas  of  the  community  to one  which,  because  of  the 
range  of  duties  and  aasortment  of staff,  is totally  inadequate  or  concerned 
only with •foreign• vessels. 
The  slackness of  soma  authorities•  inspection arrangements  leads  fishermen  to 
regard  the  technical  constraints  on  fishing  as  derisory  and  requiring 
compliance only by others. 
In moat Member  states,  the material resources reveal  technical shortcomings as 
regards both equipment  and organization arising from the fact that their staff 
are  required  to  carry  out  national  defence  and  maritime  security  duties  as 
well as  fisheries inspections. 
several  Member  States  have  no  airborne  surveillance,  which  considerably 
reduces  the  effectiveness  of  inspections  at sea.  However,  some  have  recently 
used  Community  assistance to improve  equipment,  particularly in the  fields  of 
communications  and computerization. 
Annex  II  shows  for  each  Member  state  how  inspections are  organized,  the staff 
and material resources deployed and the main  shortcomings detected  • 
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The  results of this are  as  followa: 
Land-based inspections 
The  number  of  inspectors  at each  port  differs  substantially  from  one  Member 
state  to  another:  for  example  in  the  Netherlands,  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom  there are  a  number  of  inspectors at each fiahing port while  in spain, 
Ireland and France a  single inspector i• responsible for a  number  of ports. 
The  inadequacy of the  resources available for  inspections in the ports of some 
Member  states  raises  doubts  as  to  whether  rules  on  the  conservation  of 
resources  are  being  properly  observed  there.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of 
uniformity  in the  way  these  rules  are  applied  engenders  economic  distortions 
between  fishermen in different places. 
Sea-based inspections 
In  general  the  seagoing  and  airborne  resources  employed  to  inspect  fisheries 
areas  are  inadequate  for the extent of the areas  to be  inspected.  The  size of 
their fishing  grounds  makes  this  problem particularly acute in certain Member 
States 
Finally,  although  the  data in Annex  II should be  considered in the light of  a 
number  of  factors,  such  as  the  specific  features  of  the  different  fisheries, 
the  internal  organization  of  national  inspection  services  and  the  technical 
characteristics  of  inspection  vessels,  it nevertheleas  remains  true  that  the 
level  of  inspection  is  inadequate  and  varies  considerably  from  one  Member 
state  to  another.  Alignment  with  bast  practice  is  essential  if  the  common 
fisheries policy is to remain credibile and succo•sful. 
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2.1.2 Inspections undertaken 
Pursuant  to  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3561/85,4  the  commission  receives  each  year 
information  on  inspections  carried out at sea  and  in the  porta  of the  Member 
states.  Annex  III  contains  statistics  for  1UO  based  on  the  information 
received from  the Kember states. 
These  show  that.z 
(a)  inspections at sea: 
the  inspection eervice• of tbe Member  states undertook  12  170  days 
of  inspection in community  waters~ 
more  than  20  500  inspections  of  vesae1a  were  carried  out  and 
infringements detected in over 2  393  cases  (about  12%)~ 
most infringements concerned failure to respect technical measures: 
prohibited  gear,  fishing  in  forbidden  areas,  fishing  without  a 
licence  and  failure to record catches  (logbooks); 
Cb»  inspections in porta led to detection of more  than  2  600  infringements, 
mostly  concerning  recording  of  catches  and  the  landing  of  under-sized 
fish~ 
(c)  appeals  to tbe  courts  were  lodged  in  only  a  comparatively  small  number 
of cases of infringement.  Kany  infringements were  not puraued. 
These figures  should be  interpreted with soma  caution: 
the  number  of  days  of  inspection  is  probably  over-stated  since  some 
inspection vessels are not concerned solely with fisheries inspection  work~ 
4  OJ  No  L  339,  18.12.1985,  p.  29. 
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the  high  percentage  of  infringements  detected  ia  probably  due  to  the 
inspection authorities concentrating their effortm  on vessels likely not to 
have  complied with the rules. 
2.2  community  inspection 
since  1983.  there  baa  been  a  special  department  for  fisheries  control, 
inspection and  licences in the Commiaaion•s  Directorate-General for Fisheries. 
Ita  task  is  to  develop  and  administer  the  community  policy  on  fisheries 
control.  In  1983  the  department  had  a  etaff  of  15,  including  7  inspectors; 
the present staff now  exceeds  40,  including  19  inspectors. 
The  commission  inspectors  are  recruited  primarily  from  civil  and  military 
national  inspection  services,  under  contracts  for  a  maximum  of  five  years. 
This  limited period  of  service  with  the  Commission  permits  the  inspectors  to 
apply  the  experience  gained  with  the  community  when  they  return  to  their 
national administrations. 
The  tasks of the inspectors fall mainly  under one  of  two headings: 
checking the work  of the national inspection authorities; 
direct inspection of fishing activities in the  NAFO  and  CCAMLR  areas. 
2.2.1 checking the work of the national inspection authorities 
The  inspectors  carry out tours of duty,  generally  lasting two  weeks,  in 
Member  states.  They work  in teams of two,  and never in their own  Member 
states.  It  has  happened  that  these  tours  have  had  to  be  extended, 
sometimes  for several months,  in order to carry out proper checks • 
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Tho  inspectors  vieit  tho  fiahing  ports  and  travel  on  the  aurveillance 
vessels  (and  aircraft)  of  Member  statoa.  They  themselves  do  not  carry 
out direct inspections  but  accompany  national  inspectors  to  check  that 
the  latter aro  monitoring  correctly  the  enforcement  of  tho  community•a 
own  conservation  ruloa,  both  in  community  waters  and  in  international 
waters  subject  to  quantitative  restrictions  (TACs  and  quotas),  and  of 
fishing  agreements  witb  non-lll8Biber  countries  and  international 
conventions.  The  inspectors  also  carry  out  checks  within  national 
inspectorates,  particularly the departments handling catch data. 
Inspection  tours  are  subject  to  rseveral  determining  factors z  fishing 
seasons,  specific  fleets,  shortcomings  of  one  or  another  Kember  state, 
etc.  Although  the  comminion  has  the  right  to  be  present  in  fishing 
ports to verify the national authorities inspection operations it tries, 
in  accordance  with  the  procedure  foreseen  in  Regulation 2241/87,  to 
agree,  insofar  as  is  possible,  an  inspection  programme  with  the 
inspection  service  of  the  Member  state  concerned,  one  or  two  weeks  in 
advance.  In  some  eases,  especially  where  irregularities  are  suspected 
(for  example,  false  atatements  of  landings  which  have  to  be  cheeked 
further),  the  advance notice is much  shorter. 
The  confidential  reports  drawn  up  by  the  inspectors  are  used  by  the 
Commission  to  exert  appropriate  administrative  pressure  where 
irregularities  are  detected  and  as  a  basis  for  compiling  infringement 
dossiers  under  the  procedure provided  for in Article 169  of  the  Treaty. 
These  reports  are  admissible  by  the  court  as  evidence.  5  It is mainly 
the  work  of  the  inspectors  that  has  given  the  cOJIIIIlisaion  a  thorough 
knowledge  of the realities of the  community  fishing  industry  and it has 
also made  a  substantial contribution to the comments  contained in parts 
3  and  4  of this Report. 
The  table  in Annex  IIIa  shows  the  inspections  carried out by  community 
staff in recent years. 
5  case c-64/88  commission  v  French Republic. 
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2.2.2  Xnopections  in HAFO  and  CCAMLR  water• 
since  1988,6  inapectiono  havo  ~en extended  to  the  waters  of  the  North 
Weut  Atlantic  Figheriez  organization  (HAFO)  under  the  common  inspection 
programme in which  the  community  and other contracting partie• take part 
(Canada,  Japan,  etc.).  Xn  theae  watera,  the  commission  effects  through 
the  community  inspectors  a  common  international  inspection  programme. 
These  can  be  designated  by  thG!I  commiuion  or  by  a  Member  State.  'l'he 
inspectors  appointgd by ths  cammieaion  carry out direct inspections  and 
furthermore,  the  Member  states can designate  their  own  inapectora.  'l'o 
this  end,  the  Commission  organize•  inspection voyages  every year  aboard 
vessels  which  it charters  directly or which  ere  placed at ita disposal 
by  a  Member  state,  subject  to  some  financial  contribution  from  the 
community.  In  1991  Commission  inapectora  carried  out  inspections  in 
these  waters  lasting  seven  montha  on  a  veaael  chartered  by  the 
Commission.  They  also  opent  a  number  of  weeks  on  an  inspection  vessel 
belonging to a  Member  State. 
The  purpose  of  inspections  in  the  NAFO  area  is  to  check  on  the 
application  of  NAFO  rules  by  the  ve~ssels  of  the  various  contracting 
parties  and  to  check  the  application  of  111pecific  community  rules  by 
community  vessels  in  the  waters  in  question.  'l'he  Commiasion  notifies 
the  secretariat General  of  NAFO  and,  in  ~ome casas,  the  Member  states 
and  other  contracting  parties  of  the  findingo  of  theae  inspection 
voyages  and  contacts  national  adminiatrations  to  ensure  that  presumed 
infringements  are properly followed  up. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  commission  for  the  conservation of Antarctic 
Marine  Living  Resources  (CCAMLR)  hau  duly  adopted  a  monitoring  and 
inspection  system  for  Antarctic water•  and the  council  has  applied this 
system  to the  community,7  community  inspectors  have  not yet carried out 
inspections  in these  waters,  mainly  because  community  vessels  are still 
not very active there. 
6  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2868/88,  16.1.1988,  OJ  No  L  257,  17.9.1988,  p.  20. 
7  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3943/90,  19.10.1990,  OJ  No  L  379,  31.12.1990,  p.  45 • 
. I. - 13  -
3.  Operations to ensure compliance with conservation measures 
The  rules  on  TACs  and  quotas  and  those  laying  down  technical 
conservation  measures  (mesh  aizes  and  fishing  bans  in  certain  areas) 
are,  in themselves,  difficult to enforce  because  of  the  great diversity 
of the  fiehing  industry,  the  extent  of  the waters  to be  monitored,  the 
mobility  of  fisherman,  the  mixed  nature  of  the  fisheries  and  the 
inevitable complexity of the legislation. 
Fishermen  often dispute  the  justification for  conservation measures  and 
their recalcitrant attitude often extends to the authorities responsible 
for  enforcing  the  measures.  In  addition,  fishermen  are  extremely 
sensitive  on  the  question  of  uniform  enforcement  of  community  measures 
throughout  the  community.  such  uniformity  is  extremely  difficult  to 
achieve,  mainly  because  the  inspection  system  is  a  national 
responsibility. 
The  monitoring  task  is  also  made  much  more  arduous  by  the  fact  that 
fleet capacity greatly exceeds  available fishing opportunities. 
3.1  compliance with  TACs  and quotas 
overall,  compliance  with  TACs  and  quotas  is  extremely  poor.  As  they 
have  done  now  for  several  decades,  scientific working  parties  have  made 
realistic  estimates  of  catches  independent  of  official  figures.  These 
show  considerable  discrepancies,  ranging  up  to  60%,  between  •official• 
and  •actual•  catches.  The  problem is not limited to certain stocks  nor 
to a  single region.  It affects all sectors  and takes  a  wide variety of 
forms,  even  that  of  over-declarations,  as  happens  when  a  Member  state 
fears  a  reduction  in  its entitlements  if it admits  too  low  a  level  of 
catches.  over-declaration may  also result from  a  false certification of 
origin of catches,  so that the under declaration of one catch is matched 
by over-declaration of another. 
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The  Commission  baa  made  regular use  of  its power  to close  a  fishery  on 
the  basis  of  information  that  a  Member  state  baa  exhausted  ita  quota. 
However,  the  commission  baa  no  direct accesa  to vessels'  logbooks.  The 
Member  states  use  them  only  to  determine  fishing  zones  while  the 
information they contain could constitute a  valuabl&  source of data. 
All  too  often  the  Member  states  regard  quotas  as  minimum  quantities  to 
be  achieved  rather  than  a•  maximwn  quantities  not  to  be  exceeded. 
National  legislation is  generally  designed  to  enable  fiahermen  to  make 
full  use  of  quotas  but  often  lacks  provisions  to prevent  over-fishing. 
Under  existing  community  legislation,  over-fishing  of  a  quota  by  a 
Member  state  cannot  be  sanctioned  unleaa  another  Member  state  suffers 
damage  as  a  result,  that  is,  if  over-fishing  results  in  a  TAC  being 
reached  before  all  the  quotas  are  exhausted.  Furthermore,  no  aid  for 
withdrawal  from  the  market  is  paid  in  respect  of  quantities  fished  in 
excess  of  a  quota. 
It would nevertheless be  appropriate to extend the legislation so that a 
Member  state  could  be  sanctioned  irrespective  of  whether  another  had 
suffered  harm.  The  court of  Justice  baa  stated  several  times  that  the 
Member  States,  in  every  circumstance,  must  take  any  measures  necessary 
to prevent over-fishing of quotas.  In principle all over-fishing should 
be  sanctioned.  However,  if  this  were  done,  there  would  have  to  be 
provisions to dissuade  Member  states from making  false declarations. 
3.2  Recording  and notification of catches 
Existing 
catches 
community  legislation  on  the  monitoring 
is  not  always  applied  with  the  vigour 
and  recording  of 
required  to  ensure 
complete  records  of  catches  and  their  correct  communication  to  the 
commission. 
There  are  also  shortcomings  as  regards  the  monitoring  of  catches 
transported  by  lorry  to  the  place  of  sale  or  processing  factory,  or 
exported direct.  rn  such cases,  if there is no  inspection at the point 
of  landing,  products  disappear  into  the  marketing  circuit  and  their 
origin can  no  longer be  ascertained. 
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Commercial transactions are constantly expanding  and the prospect of the 
abolition  of  controls  at  the  community's  internal  frontiers  means  that 
community  and  national  legislation  must  be  tightened  up.  Legialation 
should  provide  for  •integrated controls•,  that is,  from  the  producer to 
the consumer  (see para.  4.5). 
It  appears  that  certain  Member  states  deliberately  delay  transmitting 
catch  data  to  the  commission  in  order  to  delay  closure  of  a  fishery 
where  a  quota  is  exhausted.  Annex  IV  lists delays  in  transmission  by 
Member  state.  It  is  obvious  that  this  practice  must  be  fought  as 
vigorously as possible.  The  commission considers that,  where it detects 
repeated delays  in the transmission of data,  it should have  the power to 
close the fishery. 
3.3  Meshes  and minimum  sizes 
There  is  also  a  very  low  level  of  compliance  with  the  legislation  on 
meshes  and  minimum  sizes.  Although  some  fleets  comply  with  remarkable 
correctness,  this  is  certainly  not  the  rule.  Available  estimates  of 
catches  of  small  fish are  damning.  They  show that in certain areas  the 
selectivity  of  many  trawl  cod-ends  does  not  in  any  way  correspond  to 
what  should  result  from  legal  mesh  sizes.  A  combination  of  inadequate 
inspections  and  the  shortcomings  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3094/86  has 
largely encouraged these infringements. 
It is  easy to use  mesh  sizes  permitted by derogation  for other,  illicit 
purposes  and  make  use  of  devices  which  prevent  the  vast  bulk  of  small 
fish  from  escaping.  Fraudulent  catches,  consisting  mainly  of  fish 
smaller than the minimum  size,  have  no difficulty in finding purchasers. 
This  demonstrates  the  extent  to  which  minimum  sizes  are  being  ignored. 
In  some  cases,  fishing  for  juveniles  in  this  way  has  increased  since 
introduction of the CFP. 
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3.4  Boxes  and internal licences 
The  system of boxes  appears  to have  been much better respected,  probably 
because it is easier to  check  on  the position of  a  fishing  vessel  than 
on  ita  meshes  and  catches.  The  positive  impact  of  the  Norway  pout, 
mackerel and North sea plaice boxes  baa  been demonstrated in  a  number  of 
atudiea. 
The  licensing  syatem  within  the  community  has  been  managed  in  a 
satisfactory  fashion  but  on-the-spot  inspections  have  led  to  varying 
results. 
The  situation  in  the  Shetland box,  which  uses  both  licences  and  a  box, 
is satisfactory.  This  area has  undoubtedly benefited from the declining 
interest in the sector of certain fleets.  Transmission of data could be 
improved but an affective management  tool has  been established. 
There  are  problems  in undertaking  on-the-spot inspections  under  the  Act 
of  Accession  of  spain  and  Portugal,  since  some  fishermen  use  quite 
sophisticated  techniques  to  escape  inspection  and  penalties.  Better 
coordination  between  the  responsible  authorities  of  the  countries 
concerned could put an  end to these practices. 
3.5  External resources  and monitoring 
As  regards  the  external  licensing  scheme  (waters  of  non-member 
countries),  while  the  issuing of  licences  under  the  agreements  has  been 
•atisfactory,  •partner•  countries  have  constantly  deplored  failures  by 
community vessels to comply with the rules. 
It is difficult to assess to what extent these accusations are  justified 
but it is true that  logbooks,  to deal  only with this aspect,  have  often 
been  completed  with  a  degree  of  carelessness,  and  sometimes  the 
information  they  contain  is  manifestly  false.  Bence  it  has  proved 
impossible  to  use  the  information  available  to  introduce  validation 
tests. 
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Fisheries  in  the  NA!'O  zone  are  a  special  but  important  case.  The 
commiaaion  baa  devoted  conmider&ble  resources  to  monitoring  activities 
in this  zone,  aometimea  at the  expense of monitoring in other fields or 
areas  since ita staff and financial  and mat&rial resources are limited. 
Where  the  resources  required  have  been  deployed  in  the  RAFO  zone, 
considerable  progress  as  regards  inapections  at sea  has  been  achieved. 
The  effectivenesa  of  community  inspectors  baa  made  it  possible  to 
exercise  a  great  deal  of  pr(llallure  to  ensure  coapliance  with  technical 
measures  and  the  keeping  of  logbooks.  some  doubts  still  persist, 
however,  about  the  actual  total  catches  of  certain  fleets  and  to  deal 
with this problem it bas been decided to step up  inspections both at sea 
and at the point of landing. 
'l'he  recently  adopted  systems,  notably  the  "hail  system•,  under  which 
vessels will be required to indicate their entry into and departure  from 
each  fisheries  sector,  as  is  done  now  in  the  Shetland  box,  as  well  as 
the aerial surveillance system,  will conatitute a  considerable advance. 
4.  Major  shortcomings  in the  implementation of inspection legislation 
4.1  Inherent difficulties 
While  inspection  poses  considerable  problema  for  the  CFP,  theae  should 
be  kept  in  perspective  by  remembering  that  they  are  encountered  by  all 
fiahery  management  policies.  All  studies  agree  that  the  root  of  the 
problem is the fact that resources are not private property.  There is a 
constant  tension  between  the  individual  abort-term  interest  and  the 
collective  long-term  interest.  The  fisherman's  immediate  peraonal 
interest is in catching the greatest possible quantity of fish,  large or 
small,  provided they  are marketable.  'l'aken  together,  the  logic  pursued 
by  many  individuals  leads  in  the  end  to  the  cla  ..  ical  aberrations  of 
overfishing and mismanagement. 
Rules  ~ust be  introduced to safeguard the  long-term collective interest. 
Fishermen  would  then  be  faced  with.  a  choice  between  respecting  the 
rules,  and  forgoing  profit,  and  what  they  perceive  as  their  own 
interest,  which would induce  them to consider fraud. 
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Thia  •objective•  analyaia  im  complicated  by  both  paychological  and 
cultural  factor•.  In  the  boat  of  ca11ea,  the  fieharman  wi11hea  to  act 
correctly;  in  tho  worat,  fraud  become•  acceptable,  or  even  admired 
within the pear group. 
The  two  objective  factors  on  which  everything  depend•  are  the 
probability of inspection and the diaauasive natura of penalties. 
4.2  Lack of  inspection resources and dissuasive penalties 
4.2.1 Inspections 
To  increase  the  probability  of  a  penalty,  the  means  for  carrying  out 
inspections at sea or on  land must  firat be  expanded.  These  means  must 
be  adequate  in  both  quantity  and  quality,  employ  sufficiently  modern 
techniques  and  trained staff  and  offer  a  clear operational  organization 
pursuing  a  well  defined  atrategy.  The  elements  of  an  infringement 
detected  must  also  be  strong  enough  legally  for  &  case  to  stand  up  in 
court.  The  pre-requisites  are  therefore  complex  and  cannot  be 
introduced  as  quickly  as  would  be  desirable.  The  CFP  faces  a  special 
difficulty  in  that  these  control  duties  are  shared  between  the  Member 
states  and  the  commission.  Even  in  what  appear  to  be  simpler  cases, 
coming  under  the  responsibility  of  a  single  country,  very  thorough 
studies  have  revealed  how  much  a till remains  to  be  done.  It has  been 
shown  (by  sutinen et al.,  1990)  that  fraud  in  fisheries  managed  by  the 
United  states  federal  authorities  was  highly  lucrative  and  generated 
profits  exceeding  the  penalties.  In  the  George  Bank  fiahery,  illegal 
landings  range  from  11\  to  25%  of  catches;  the  fishermen  regularly 
coJIUIIitting  infringements  make  up  between  25'  and  49\  of  the  fishing 
population. 
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The  material  reaourcea  for  monitoring  on  land  have  been  gradually 
modernized  and  computerized  in  some  Member  states,  although  quayside 
inspections  are still clearly  inadequate.  Despite  financial  aaaiatance 
from  the  community,  many  v•aaela  used  for  fisheries  surveillance  are 
insufficiently  or  unsuitably  equipped,  while  airborne  eurv•illance  ia 
inadequate. 
To  make  beat  usa  Qf  the  existing  resources  in  the  Member  states,  the 
following  two  management  and  control  monitoring  instruments  should  be 
considered: 
automatic  communication  of  positions  and  movements  of  fishing 
vessels operating in the vaters of the Member  statesJ 
a  licensing  aystem which  would reatrict the fishing effort by  zone 
and  by  fiahery.  Besides  locating  veaaela,  this  would  provide  an 
effective penalty  (withdrawal of the licence)  and would be the beat 
way  of  limiting  the  overcapacity  in  the  fleet  which  in  certain 
caaes lies behind infringements of conservation measures. 
The  Commission  is  also  exploring  the  possibility  of  using  new 
technologies to improve  fisheries surveillance.  These  should permit the 
immediate  and  automatic  remote  identification and location of vessels by 
satellite,  so  improving  both  surveillance  and  safety.  A  pilot 
surveillance  system of  this  kind,  partly  financed  by  the  community,  ia 
at present being tried out in Portugal. 
Detailed  information  about  what  has  been  achieved  in this  field may  be 
found  in Annex  v. 
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4.2.2 Penalties 
Unleas  aubatantial  and very coatly resource•  for  inspoctiona at  sea can 
be  developed quickly, it seems very difficult to ensure that an i•olated 
infringement  is  v•ry  likely  to  attract  a  penalty.  To  compen&ate,  the 
severity of the penalty ahould bo  increaaed. 
:In  fisheries  managed  by  the  fishermen  themselves,  tbia  severity  may 
reach a  very high degree,  through the withdrawal of licences.  obviously 
this can be  done  only where  accosa to fiabing ia not free but subject to 
a  licensing  or  similar  syatem.  :If  adminiatrativa  penalties  cannot  be 
imposed  or  are  not  sufficient,  the  procedure  makes  provision  for  the 
alleged  offender  to  be  brought  before  a  court.  Experience  ahows  that 
penal  ties  are  often  very  light.  This  raiaes  the  queation  of  whether 
judges  in many  Member  states are aufficiently aware  of what  is at stake 
or whether they do not tend to view the fiaherman  as  the wretched victim 
of  absurd and technocratic regulations.  :In  effect,  the decisions of the 
jurisdictions  are  not  always  dissuasive.  Lagal  texts  are  sometimes 
interpreted in such  a  way  that courts add  an  extra safety margin  to the 
tolerances explicitly allowed.  As  in the American example  quoted above, 
fines  are  paltry  compared  with  the  profits  to  be  secured  by  fraud. 
Frequently,  the moat dissuasive factor remains  the  immobilization of the 
vessel for  inspection purposes. 
:It  is  true  that  the  prospect  of  a  penalty  is  so  remote  that,  if  the 
system is to act as  a  deterrent,  ita severity would have to be  increased 
to  such  an  extent that those  •unfortunate•  enough  to be  sentenced could 
feel unfairly treated. 
A  community  policy  imposing  limitations  and  constraints  on  the 
activities  of  those  involved  and  •ometimas  going  so  far  as  to undermine 
their  short-term  economic  and  financial  interests  cannot  be  credible, 
and  therefore  acceptable,  unless  the  aanctioning  of  infringements  is 
equitable,  which doea not aeam  to be the case at present  (see Annex  V:I) • 
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However,  it ia  clear  that  harmonization  of  judicial  procedures,  fines 
and  other penalties  across  the community  is at present a  very difficult 
political goal.  Action should therefore be taken to remove  the economic 
incentive to commit  infringements by reducing demand  for the products of 
illegal  operations  and  by  imposing  financially  dissuasive  penalties  on 
infringements detected. 
This  could entail financing  campaigns  to  increase  awareness  among  both 
producers  and consumers  by publicizing the damage  caused to resources  by 
failure  to  respect  legislation,  e.g.  by  using  nets  with  excessively 
small mesh  sizes,  which  leads to under-sized fish being landed.  It must 
also be ensured that at least the whole  economic profit derived from the 
infringement  is  clawed  back.  This  principle  has  been  accepted  in 
certain  cases  of  infringement  (Article  11(3)  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
2241/87). 
Even  the  possibility  of  incorporating  into  community  legislation  the 
right  for  the  commission  to  refuse  aid  or  grants  to  authorities  or 
organizations  which  systematically  fail  to  ensure  compliance  with  the 
law should be  considered. 
In general terms,  it would  be desirable for the commission to be  able to 
utilise  sanctions  against  those  operators  who  do  not  respect  those 
community  regulations in force. 
4.3  Lack of political commitment 
The  commitment  of  the  political  authorities  to  the  monitoring  of 
enforcement  is  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  policy.  However, 
commitment  is  lacking  in  several  Member  states,  a  number  of  which,  for 
example,  fail  to  apply  national  measures  which  are  more  severe  than 
those  laid  down  by  community  legislation  in  situations  where  this  is 
required  for  inspections  to  be  effective.  Consequently  the 
administrations  responsible  for  monitoring  are  inaufficiently motivated 
and  equipped. 
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4.4  Practical difficulties besotting community  inspection 
'l'he  community  legislation  entrusts  commission  inspectors  not  with  the 
role  of  monitoring  filihing  directly  (except  in  the  NAl"O  and  CCAMLR 
areas)  but  with  the  task  of  ensuring  on  the  spot  that  national 
administrations  are  discharging  their  fisheries  surveillance  duties  in 
accordance with community rules. 
Since  the  common  policy  was  first  introduced,  some  Kamber  States  have 
been reluctant to accept  community  checks,  especially those  carried out 
on  the  spot  by  commission  officials.  In  addition,  in  several  Mf\tmber 
States visits by  community  inapectors are known  of in advance,  resulting 
in these control operations losing any effectiveness. 
'l'he  attitude of most  of  the  Member  states is explained by  their concern 
to  retain  sovereignty.  'l'he  basic  rules  on  monitoring,  and  subsequent 
reinforcements  proposed  by  the  commission,  were  the  subject  of  lengthy 
and  detailed  discussions  at  council  level  (Ministers  for  Fisheries). 
Bence  the  Member  states  have  always  reserved  the  right  to  reject  an 
inspection  programme  proposed  by  the  commission.  Although  inspection 
programmes  are  drawn  up by mutual  agreement,  it has  happened  on occasion 
that  community  inspectors  have  been  unable  to operate  in a  region where 
an  inspection should have  taken place because of the lack of cooperation 
from  the  national  authorities.  'l'he  commission  considers  that  in  such 
cases it should  have  the right to  impose,  under ita  own  responsibility, 
an  inspection in those porta  where it considers this should be  done. 
In  conclusion,  to  avoid  any  inconvenience,  it should  be  indicated that 
the  commission  should  be  able  to  organise,  autonomously,  inspection 
missions  without  prejudice  to  the  powers  of  the  national  inspection 
services. 
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4.5  Lack of an overall approach to inepection in  th~ common  fisheri•• policy 
The  scope  of  the  in11pection  regulation  im  li.mitod  to  checks  on  the 
policy  on  conservation  of  r®eourcma.  Thic  mGanm  that  community 
inspectors are unable to chock  compli&nce with market organization rules 
and  measures  for  implementing  the  structural  policy.  The  current 
situation  is  paradoxical;  in  &  rogion  ~hare 
organization  of  fishermen,  ~ymt~tically  fail 
fiahermen, 
to  respect 
or  an 
certain 
conservation measures,  they continu0.to recsiwe  grants  under  the market 
regulations or the atructural policy bmcauao  of  thm  lack of  any overall 
monitoring of all aspects of the common  fisheries policy. 
4.6  Lack of coordination between the  variou~ inspection bodies 
In moat  Member  states,  inspectionm at aoa,  in porta  and after first sale 
are the responsibility of different authorities,  often with no effective 
coordination.  This situation results in a  diaoipation of tho inspection 
effort and  sometimes  prevents  action baing taken against an infringement 
because it is impossible to assemble the •vidence aufficiently quickly. 
some  unauthorized  fishing  activities,  carried out  by  vessels  belonging 
both  to  non-member  countries  and  to  community  Member  states,  escape 
inspection,  partly  because  of  the  lack  of  inspection  resources, 
particularly  for  airborne  surveillance,  in  c®rtain  zones  of  community 
waters  and  because  of  poor  coordination of  in~pection operations  by the 
various  Member  states.  For  example,  the  Mi3mbar  States  have  hitherto 
taken  scarcely any  steps  to  organize inspections  of their  own  fiahormen 
fishing  in  zones  belonging to othsr  MGmber  Stat~e.  Although  the  United 
Nations  convention  on  the  Law  of  th0  SGa  recogniZ$B  the  right  of 
pursuit,  at least under certain conditiono,  thG  MGmber  states appear to 
make  no  use  of  this  against  their  own  VCI!Uleltil,  thom0  of  other  Member 
states or those of non-member  countriG0. 
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It alae  bappena  that the  facta  aa  recorded  by  the  staff who  detect the 
infringement  ars  not  acc$pted  as  sufficient evidence  before  the  court• 
of the Member  statea responaibla  for  legal proceedings  and  eo  no  action 
ia taken. 
4.7  Lack of information about the  grounds  for conservation meaauree 
The  objective  limitations  on  the  inspection  and  penalty  ayatsm  make  the 
aubjoctive  elements  of  the  problem  of  reapect  for  the  rules  of  vital 
importance.  A  fiaherman  iu  not  constitutionally  predispoeed  to  fraud. 
When  be  is  convinced  that  a  rule  ie  aoundly  baaed,  he  may  accept 
restrictions on his activities.  social pressure from the peer group may 
also provide  a  considerable incentive to comply with the rules. 
on  the  other  hand,  when  a  rule  is  oeen  as  being  devoid  of  any 
justification,  those  who  infringe  it enhance  their  personal  standing. 
unfortunately,  this  is  the  situation  within  the  community.  While  the 
national  authorities  have  formally  accepted the  CFP  and its rules,  many 
groups  feel  very  frustrated.  Not  only  fisherman  but  aomati.mes 
substantial  sectors  of  public  opinion  regard  the  existing  rules  aa 
wrong.  Where  an  infringement is committed theae groups  take  the  aide of 
the  offender  against  the  administration.  In  such  a  context  it  is 
difficult  to  generate  a  collective  desire  to  improve  respect  for  the 
rules.  Without  going  so far as  to allege complicity,  there exist within 
certain  Member  states  attitudes  ranging  from  slackness,  i.e.  turning  a 
blind  eye  to what  should  be  puniahed,  to  a  one-sided  interpretation of 
the  CFP,  which  regards  those  aspects  which  the  Member  state  concerned 
finds  inconvenient  as  of  little  importance.  While  it  may  be  in  the 
interests of the individual fi&herman  to commit  fraud,  it may  also be in 
the  interests of  the  Member  state to  allow certain  infringements  to  go 
on  and the  commission has  not so far been able to prevent this. 
Without  seeking  perfection,  it  il'il  clear  that  an  active  information 
policy  would  aupport  the rules  and  inspactions.  Tbia  would explain the 
bases  of the CFP  and stress the harm done to the Community  as  a  whole  by 
individual cases of fraud. 
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5.  conclusions 
Now  that  the  Community  inspectorate  baa  been  in  operation  for  eight 
years,  despite constant pressure on the Member  states,  implementation of 
legislation ia still subject to serious  shortcomings.  Any  progress that. 
has been made  remains far from adequate.  However,  the experience gained 
has permitted identification of the moat  serious  gaps  and  suggested the 
outline of  a  strategy for achieving greater progress,  which is perfectly 
attainable if all those  concerned,  particularly on the political level, 
demonstrate the necessary will. 
While  the solution  does  not  appear to lie in direct inspections  by  the 
commission,  checks under the aegis of the common  fisheries policy should 
receive  a  fresh  impulse  in  order  to facilitate  improvements  within  the 
Kember  states  and  ensure  a  uniform spread of effort by  combining  action 
by the community with that by the Hamber  States. 
Work  is  needed  to  ensure  better  implementation  of  all  the  existing 
management  instruments: 
TACs  and  quotas; 
technical measures  such as  mesh  sizes and minimum  sizes; 
boxes; 
licences. 
A  national  monitoring  scheme  supervised  by  the  community  authority 
should be based on the following principles: 
1.  A community  authority with  autonomous  inspection powers. 
2.  A  global,  integrated  control  policy  covering  all  aspects  of  the 
common  fisheries  policy,  with particular attention to conservation· 
measures,  structural and market aspects,  and applying itself to all 
operations within the fisheries network. 
3.  surveillance  of  the  activities  of  all  fishing  vessels  in  the 
maritime waters  of the  community,  as well as all vessels flying the 
flag  of  a  Member  state  in  third-country  or  international  waters, 
and of all landings  and transhipment• on community territory  • 
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These principle• could be put into operation by a.ana ofJ 
U•a of modern  communications  and data-processing technology. 
Use  of effective monitoring  instruments:  automatic communication of 
movements  and positions of ve•aels,  generalized licensing system. 
A  eystam  of  minimum  penalties  to  apply  in all  the  Member  States, 
backed up  by  a  system of community penalties. 
The  aim of  the  proposed  improvements  to the  inspection  system  should be 
to  bring  the  level  of  inspections  up  to  the  best  current  practice  as 
regards  technical,  legal,  economic,  •ociological  and  operational 
aspects. 
5.1  on  the  technical  level,  the  incorporation  of  modern  techniques  would 
make  inspections  simpler,  more  effective and less expensive. 
satellite  techniques  are  both  the  preferred  and  the  most  satisfactory 
solution  for  locating  vemsels  and  for  ensuring  safety  at  sea.  Use  of 
these  modern  techniques  with  introduction of  a  system for  the  automatic 
notification of the positions  and movements  of vessels  and  a  generalized 
licensing  syatem  would  make  the  best  uae  of  the  monitoring  resources 
currently  available  in  the  Member  States.  The  community  should 
therefore  secure  all  the  resources  necessary  for  introduction  and 
promotion of these techniques. 
Computerization  should  also  be  etrengthened  and  should  apply  to  a  very 
large  number  of  operations,  both  on-board  (e.g.  electronic  logbook)  and 
in  ports  (recorda  of  landinga),  so  providing  the  Commission  with  an 
increasing  flow  of  data  and  request&  in electronic  form  enabling it to 
recover  data  provided  by  different  sources.  The  Commission  should 
secure the management,  interrogation and processing instruments it needs 
for  closer  monitoring  of  fioherias,  including  in  particular  real-time 
estimates  of  the  state of  exhaustion  of  quotas.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Member  statea  too  should  make  greater  efforts  with  regard  both  to  new 
techniques  and  to  the  upgrading  of  traditional  equipment  (vessels  and 
ourveillance aircraft). 
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5.2  on  the  legal  front,  the  community  administration  should  have  greater 
real freedom  and  scope  in carrying out inapections in the Member  States. 
It should  have  greater  autonomy  from  national  administrations  so  that 
the  Commission  has  the  freedom  to  organize  inspection  missions. 
Inspectors  should  also  have  responsibility  for  monitoring  structural 
measures,  particularly  those  concerning  reductions  in  the  capacity  of 
the  fishing  fleet,  and  the  markets  in  order  to  establish  a  global 
perspective  of  the  integrated  application  of  the  Cammon  Fisheries 
Policy. 
Implementation  of  technical measures  should be assisted by  more  clearly 
defined  responsibilities  for  all  those  engaged  in  the  fish  trade 
(producers,  hauliera,  buyers  &Dd  ..rchants).  This  would  enable  action 
to  be  taken against the markets  in under-sized fish which  are currently 
flourishing  and  take  account  of  the  development  of  transport  from  one 
Member  state to  another  before  first sale.  Furthermore,  if the  powers 
of professional organizations are extended,  their responsibilities where 
the  rules  have  not  been  observed  should  also  be  clarified.  one  could 
envisage,  for  example,  a  scheme  for  sanctioning  such  organizations, 
notably  by  reductions  in quotas where  infringements were detected. 
The  range  of  administrative  and  criminal  penalties  available  to  the 
Member  states should be modernized  and,  where possible,  harmonized. 
Modernization  should  include  speedier  legal  and/or  administrative 
proceedings  so  that,  subject  to certain conditions,  a  veasel  which  had 
been apprehended could leave the port very shortly afterward&. 
Harmonization  should  alao  be  achieved  through  introduction of  a  system 
of  minimum  penalties  for  each  category of  infringement to  apply  in all 
the  Member  states.  The  minimum  penalty  should at least be  as  great as 
the economic or financial  gain generated by the infringement.  Penalties 
should  also  be  graduated,  ranging  fr011  aeizure  of  banned  gear  and 
catches,  withdrawal  of  licence,  or  temporary  seizure  of  the  vessel  to, 
in the most  serious cases,  permanent withdrawal of the master's ticket  • 
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There  ahould  alao  be  a  ayatem  of  Community  penaltiaa  applying  to  all 
activitiaa  (relevant to community competence). 
court  judgment•  ahould  be  acrutinized  to  aaaeas  the  and-result  of  tba 
monitoring  provia~ons,  and  in  particular  their  diaauaaive  affect.  At 
the  •ame tiDe,  there ahould be  a  mean•  of penalizing Member  states which 
have  not  boDOured  their  obligations;  for  ex&ll\ple,  the  exceeding  of 
quota&  and  delays  in  the  tranam.iaaion  to  the  commiaaion  of  data  on 
landings  should attract sanctiona. 
5.  3  Economic  assistance  should  be  more  closely  linked  to  respect  for  the 
inspection  regulations.  The  attribution  of  aid  and  grants  should  be 
dependent  on  compliance  with  legislation  ao  that  those  carrying  out 
systematic  fraud would receive  no  financial aid from the community.  The 
community  authority should have greater powers  in this regard. 
Aid  should continue  to be  provided to  promote  development  of  inspection 
instruments,  particularly new  techniques. 
5.  4  The  sociological  dimension  of  progress  should  have  two  elements:  the 
search  for  support  in  professional  organizations  to  promote  greater 
discipline  and  the preparation of  an  information policy about what  fraud 
really  entails. 
fishing  and  at 
This  information  should  be  aimed  at  those  engaged  in 
the  general  public,  administrations  responsible  for 
inspections,  and  the  legal profession. 
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5.5  At  operational  level,  the  commi ..  ion  should  atrengthen  ita  links  with 
all  national  administrations  and  increaae  its coordinating  role  among 
the  Namber  states.  coordination,  sometimes  between  departments  in  the 
same  Kember  state,  will  be  of  major  importance  in  the  yeara  to  came. 
This  is  true  both  of  inspections  on  land,  where  difficulties  will  be 
increased  by  the  single  market,  and  at sea,  where  inspections  and  the 
•righ~· of pursuit in waters  under  the  jurisdiction of  another  Member 
state  (outside  territorial  water••  should  be  exploited  and  organized 
irrespective of the flag under which the vessel is sailing. 
It would  be  desirable  to  set  up  a  committee  for  the  monitoring  of  the 
common  fisheries  policy,  in  which  all  problems  relating  to  the 
monitoring  of  the  CFP  would  be  diacu ..  ed,  and  which  would  facilitate 
this  coordination.  The  committee  could  also  be  asked  to  give  ita 
opinion  on  any  commission  decision  to  impose  penalties  on  Member  states 
or professional organizations. 
A  programme  for the training of national inspectors  should also be  drawn 
up  with  the  Member  States.  This  would  include  time  spent  with  the 
commission and in the Kember  states so that decisions taken at community 
level  concerning  the  evolution  of  the  CFP  would  be  well  known  to  and 
understood  by  those  responsible  for  ensuring  that  they  are  respected. 
It  would  also  provide  inspection  staff  with  a  community  view  of  how 
inspections are carried out. 
The  commission  would  be  able  to  make  beat  possible  usa  of  ita  limited 
staff  if  a  plan  of  action  were  drawn  up.  While  some  resources  would 
have  to be  allocated to routine activities  concerning the monitoring of 
inspection  in the  Kember  States,  moat  of  those  available  would  work  on 
specific  cases  regarded  as  of  particular  moment  for  the  future  of  the 
CFP. 
Each  case  identified  would  be  subject  to  sustained  scrutiny  until  a 
solution was  achieved and all necessary means  of applying pressure would 
be used. 
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The  shortcomings  which  remain  and  the  obstacles  encountered  should  not 
distract attention  from  the  progress  which  has  been made.  Provided the 
political will is  forthcoming  and  there is  a  general  awareness  of  what 
is  required,  the  further  progress  on  inspection  which  is  needed  can  be 
achieved  rapidly.  Thb  will  enable  the  common  fiaheries  policy  to 
attain tboee  objectives  which  have  so far  remained  beyond its graep  but 
which  appear r•aliatic in the light of experience. 
'l'he  table  below  seta  out  in  detail  the  shortcomings  identified  in 
implementation  of  the  common  fisheriee  policy  and  the  improvements 
contemplated. 
In the months  to come,  the  commission will  be  tabling proposals  for  the 
amendment  and  improvement  of  community  rules  along  the  linea  set  out 
above. 
. I. SHORTCOMINGS  IN  MONITORING  IMPLEMENTATION 
OF  THE  COMMON  FISHERIES  POLICY 
1.  SBOR'l'COIURGS  :nt 'f'BII:  DIPLEIIBR'I'A'l'l:OII  OF  EXISTING 
LEGISLATION 
A.  sea-baaed inspections 
Lack of coordination between  inapectio_n 
departments in the Member  States 
Inadequate monitoring of ace••• to fishing 
zonas. 
Lack of coordination between the Member 
states in pursuing infringements. 
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SUMMARY  TABLE 
PROPOSED  IMPROVEMENTS 
Introduction of regular multilat•ral ~stings between national 
inspection department•  under_the  auspices of the commission 
(exchange of  info~tion, coordination surveillance missions). 
Establishment of an inspections committee chaired by the 
commission. 
use of new  monitoring techniques  (••I•  computer networks, 
satellites). 
Introduction of a  licensing system and community  arrangements 
for movements  applicable to all vessels flying the flag of a 
Member  state and  fi•hing in community  ~aters. 
undertaking by the Member  states to use their right of pursuit 
(Article 111  of the convention on the Law  of tha sea). 
Mutual  recognition that the flag State may  inspect ita vessels 
in the waters of another Member  state. 
./. Inadequate staff and resources in the Member 
states allocated to inspection duties. 
Under-declaration of catches  in the  logbook. 
Failure to use catch data in the  logbook. 
Inadequato checks  that mesh  eizes comply 
with the rules. 
No  means  of inspecting fishing vessels 
flying the flag of  a  non-member  country in 
community waters. 
B.  Land-baaed ins.J!!C1:ione • 
Inadequate checka  on  the recording of  landings 
and transhipment&. 
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Community  financial assistance for expenditure on the 
modernization of national inspection departments  (continuation 
of existing policy). 
Reduction  in the tolerance margin  allowed. 
Amendment  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  2807/83  ("logbook 
Regulation"): 
compulsory transmission of  logbook data to the commission 
by computer. 
Compulsory  single mesh  size for certain protected fishing 
zones. 
compulsory seizure of prohibited gear. 
Introduction of a  ayetem for the compulsory communication of 
movements  and of catches held on board such vessels. 
Hew  provisions  for  landing and transhipment declarations  for 
auch vessels. 
Compulsory cross cheeks  (by the inspecting  authorities)  of 
landings  statements against sales documents. 
Regular  spot checks of catch data tranamitted to the 
commission. 
Obligation on the Member  states to include the reaulta of 
checks  in the data transmitted. 
Notification of catch data to the commission by  computer to 
permit real-time management. 
./. Failure to record catches in waters  of  non-
member  countries. 
Non-compliance  by  the Member  states with regard 
to the closure of fisheries: 
Late adoption of national measures  to 
prevent the exhaustion of quotas 
(provisional closure of fishery); 
Inadequate national measures to comply 
with a  Commission  ban on  fishing; 
Failure by producers to respect bans  on 
fishing  (fishing without a  quota). 
Inadequate inspections  and penalties for the 
landing of under-sized fish. 
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obligation on the Member  states to record and transmit to the 
commission  landings  under fisheries  agreements  with non-member 
countries. 
Provisional closure of filhery by the  Commission on 
the basis of available  info~tion where  the Member 
state fails to act; 
systematic withdrawal of EAGGF  aid  (withdrawal price 
scheme)  for quantities fish•d in excess of quotas; 
Adoption of m•asures  for th• appropriate disposal •of 
quantities fished in excess of quotas•  (e.g. 
deductions  from  the current or subsequent years), 
including a  co-efficient of penaliaation; 
Introduction of dissuasive penalties• 
Temporary  laying-up of vessel in  proportion to the 
seriousness of the infringement,  temporary suspension of 
the tickets of convicted owner-masters,  withdrawal of 
licence; 
Seizure of proceeds  from the sale of quantities fished in 
excess of quotas. 
More  thorough inspections of catches  landed in porta or 
landing stages where  these practices are current. 
Dissuasive penalties for offenders  (e.g.  systematic seizure). 
Withdrawal of community aid for non-compliance with technical 
measures;  penalties for producers•  organizations whose  members 
land under-sized fish. 
Closure of certain fisheries where catches contain too many 
under-sized fish. 
./. Delay  in transmission to the commission of 
data on  landings. 
Lack of checks on quantitiel  landed  and 
transported to poin~• of sale. 
2.  GAPS  :IR  LEGAL  DiS"l'RUMEII'l'S. 
Lack of  independence of Community  inspectors. 
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Compulsory notification to the commission of quota utilization 
estimates. 
Provisional ban  on  fiahing issued by  the Commission  where  a 
Member  state systematically fails to reapect the notification 
procedure. 
All fish transported to points of aale to be  accompanied by 
etatement of the origin of the product•  (name  of vessel, 
fishing  zone etc.). 
Register to be  kept by  the vessel's agent  shoving quantities 
landed,  place of landing,  origin of quantities  landed and 
destination  (place of marketing). 
Landings  in places  not  aubject to inapection to be subject to 
conditions;  immediate notification of quantities  landed to the 
flag state. 
Register to be  kept by  the inspecting -uthoritiea showing the 
number  of inspections carried out on land. 
Greater power•  for community  inspectors including: 
povars  for the commission to dra- up  inspection programmes 
on its own  initiative; 
possibility of amending  an inspection programme  to include 
checko  found to be  necessary on the spot; 
greater powers  for community  inspectors with regard to 
structural and markets  aspects  (general and  integrated 
inspections). 
./. Inadequate penalties disproportionate to the 
commercial  gain from  the infringement. 
Length of legal proceedings  (delays in securing 
convictions  for  fraud reduce their deterrent 
effect). 
Producers•  organizations bear no  financial 
responsability where conservation measures  are 
not respected. 
Gaps  in the procedure for implementing 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3781/85  (penalties for 
infringement of the access rules laid down  by 
the Act of Accession of spain and Portugal). 
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Introduction of a  wharmonizedW  and  wgraduatedw  system of 
national penalties,  including: 
minimum  penalties  for each type of infringement: 
temporary  laying up or suspension of the national licence: 
permanent ban or withdrawal of national licence: 
withdrawal of master's ticket. 
Introduction of  wcommunity  penaltiesw  for vessels under 
community  licences  and for operations subject to community 
approval. 
Introduction of an accelerated procedure  (security and  appeal 
system)  in each  Me~r state. 
Financial responsability on producers•  organizations. 
Financial aid subject to compliance with conservation 
measures. 
suspension or clawback of start-up and operating aid to 
producers'  o~ganizations in cases of non-compliance with 
conservation measures. 
Power  for the commission to withdraw recognition of the  PO 
granted by the Member  State. 
Application of these penalties to be  approved by the 
winspections  Committeew. 
Adoption of a  commission regulation laying down  implementing 
rules,  e.g.  fixed time limit for imposition of the penalty. 
./. 3.  LA.CJt  OF  URDE!RS'l'ARDDiG  OF  CORSERVA'l'l:OR  MEASURES. 
By  producerss 
Lack of awarene•• of the harm  caused to 
fishermen in general,  lack of  long-term view 
of the reaeon•  for  complying with 
conservation measures. 
By  consumers  1 
Traditional dietary practices run counter to 
conservation policy  (demand  for under-sized 
fish,  e.g.  hake). 
By  judicial bodieaz 
Lack of severity in dealing with offenders 
arising from  a  failure to understand 
conservation measure•  and the need for 
punishment. 
«.  LACJt  or DOWJ:.BDGB  ARD  URD!:RftMD:mG or '1'IIB 
GUIDBL:IRES  OF  '!'1111:  CFP,  RO  COIOIOBI'l'Y  DDIZRSIOR  '1'0 
DfSPEC'l'IOR. 
By  national inapectors. 
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Adoption of measures to accompany  conservation policy: 
self-discipline by  producers  ae part af the local 
management  of quotas: 
Information campaign on the long-term consequences of 
fraud: 
Financial aid to producers to reduce the costs of the 
correct implementation of conaervation  measure•  (aid for 
the purchase of  new  selective fishing gear,  etc.). 
campaign to raise awareneas of con•ervation issues. 
Information and training for  judicial  authoriti~• on 
questions raised by fraud  (credibility of the common 
fisheries policy). 
Training programmes. 
Training periods  ~ith the CommiDmion  and various national 
departments. COHKUHI'l'Y  CON'l'RIBlrl'IOH  TO  BXPEHDI'l'URB  BY  '1'BB 
IIEICBBR.  STATES  OR  DIPLBJIBII'l'ATIOB  OF  '1'BB  JtiJLBS  COIICDBDIG  '1'BB 
CONSERVATION  AND  MAHAGEKEHT  OF  FISHERIES  RESOURCES 
Table  I 
community  contributions to the Kember  States 
EEC  Contribution  (ECU  million) 
toune H  Dec •  Council  Dec.  Council  Dec. 
87/278/EEC  87/279/EEC  89/631/EEC  TOTAL 
Cell  MS)  (PT)  (ell "')  1991 
Belgium  . 
Denmark  1.660  1.660 
Ger•any  0.237  0.237 
Spefn  0.508  4.263  4.770 
France  0.720  0.720 
Greece  1.391  1.392 
Ireland  1.324  5.766  7.090 
Netherlands  0.210  0.210 
Portugal  1.040  11.500  4.800  17.340 
United  Kingo0111  0.038  2.780  2.818 
TOTAL  5.500  , 1.500  19.237  36.237 
1  Pursuant to commission Decisions  91/17/EEC  and  91/62/EEC. 
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hble II 
Contrfbutfona  prented under  the decfafons  fn  fore! 
<87/278/EEC.  17!279/EEC  end  89/631/EEC) 
es  et  31  peetmber  1991 
A•ount  PIYII!nt 
Me~r Steu  1r11nted  ..  de 
(ECU  afllfon)  (ECU  •fll  f on) 
s.r  ..  ny  0.237  -
Den;nrll  1.660  0.110 
Spafn  4.770  -
France  0.720  0.060 
Greece  1.392  -
Ireland  7.090  5.160 
letherlends  0.210  0.180 
Po,.tugal  17.340  7.180 
Unfted  Kfn1do11  2.818  0.560 
TOTAL  :  36.237  13.950 
Investments made  (at 31  December  1991) 
DENMARK: 
Equipment  for inspection vessels 
FRANCE: 
communications  and detection system 
IRELAND: 
computer equipment  (satellite surveillance) 
Zodiacs 
surveillance aircraft 
NETHERLANDS: 
computer equipment 
PORTUGAL: 
Five  inspection vessels 
Computer  and detection aystems 
Modernization of  inspection vessels 
UNITED  XIHGDOM: 
communications  and  transmission systems 
Four inspection vessels 
In the cases of inspection aircraft and vessels,  the payments  represent 
contributions. A N N E  X  I  I 
BELGIUM 
organization of inspection 
The  eea  fiabery  directorate  of  the .Hinbtry of Agriculture  ia  the  principal 
body responsible for the application of Community  control arrangements.  These 
are  exercised  by  ita  .inspection  department,  which  has  only  one  full-time 
inspector.  surveillance and inspection of fishing vessels at sea in Belgium's 
fishery  zone  is  the  responsibility  of  that  directorate  and  of  the  Belgian 
naval  authorities  (Ministry  of  Defence)  and  the Maritime  Police  (Ministry  of 
communications  and Transport).  For the latter two,  however, 
fisheries inspection is only an  occasional duty which  has  to take  second place 
to their main  duties;  this  means  that staff do  not  always  have  the  technical 
knowledge  required. 
summary  of Belgian Naval  Resources utilized for fishery control 
!XE!.  Number  Built  Speed  (knots) 
Tug  2  1950  10 
Minesweeper  1  1950  14 
Maritime Police 
vessels1  2  17 
Air surveillance 
There  are  no  resources  dedicated  to  ai.rborne  surveillance  of  fisheries,  but 
military  aircraft  may  provide  information  on  request  during  the  course  of 
their other duties. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  number  of  inspectors  is  insufficient  to  ensure  adequate  inspections  of 
landings  in  the  ports.  The  vessels  assigned  to  fishery  control  have  very 
limited  capabilities,  being  rather old,  underpowered  and  poorly  equipped.  An 
attempt  is made,  subject  to their serviceability,  to deploy  these vessels  in 
rotation  during  certain  seasonal  fisheries  in  the  southern  North sea.  This 
results in a  certain coverage  between  March  and  June  and  during september  and 
November. 
1  within the three-mile limit. 
./. -~ 
However,  eveb though Belgium baa  a  amall fishery zona,  much  of thia inapection 
effort ia rendered  ineffective  becau•e  of the unauitability of the inspection 
vaasela.  outaide  the  periods  mentioned,  aeagoing  inapection  ia  irregular and 
infrequent. 
As  regards  technical  conservation  meaaurea,  there  are  gapa  in  the  inspection 
of provision• relatin9 to minimum  aizea and  and the power  of beam trawlers. 
·'· -~ 
organization of Inspection 
The  Ministry of Fisheries is responsible  for all aspects  of  fisheries  control 
in  Denmark  through  ita  sea  Fisheries  inspectorate.  The  inspectorate  is 
organized regionally  and  consists  of  seven  centres,  each  with  between  16  and 
36  staff.  A total of 145  full-time staff are employed in the ports. 
summary  of Danish  inspection vessels 
Name  Year of  Length  Gross  Speed  (knots) 
building  Tonnage 
Nords121en  1967  53  m  475  14 
Nordjylland 1967  53 m  475  14 
Vestkysten  1987  so  m  500  16 
Jens  vaever  1965  30  m  142  10 
Bavornen  1979  so  m  324  16 
Viben  1977  16  Dl  23  20 
Bavternen  1975  17  m  31  12 
A total of  118  persons  are engaged in inspections at sea. 
Air surveillance 
No  means  of airborne surveillance of fisheries is employed. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  main  problem concerns  the determination of species during port inspections 
of  catches  ·destined  for  the  production  of  fishmeal  and  oil  and  affects 
principally  by-catches  of  whiting  and  herring.  Catch  declarations  for  this 
fishery  are often based  on  unchecked  data  and  the  Commission  has  requested  an 
inquiry. 
The  coastal fishing  fleet in the  Skagerrak  and  Kattegat often makes  incorrect 
declarations  of  species  landed in order to avoid  exhaustion of certain quotas 
or  the  closure  of  a  fishery  by  the  commission.  Inspections  in those  areas, 
particularly of vessels  from  non-member  countries,  should be  stepped up. 
The  Danish  inspection  authorities  have  at  their  disposal  considerable 
resources  in  terms  of  personnel  and  equipment  for  checks  at  sea,  following 
internal reorganization and  financial assistance  from the community.  However, 
three  of  the  seven  inspection  centres  referred  to  above  give  priority  to 
rescue  operations. 
./. -4\,-
organization of inspections 
Responsibility  for  the  application of  community  control  arrangements  falls  to 
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the authorities of the 
LUnder schleswig-Holstein,  Niadersachaen,  Bremen  and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
The  Linder  have  a  staff  of  47  full-time  fi•hery  inspectors  stationed  in  the 
porta. 
surveillance and inspection of fishing activity in tha German  fishery  zone  are 
conducted  by  vessels  of  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  the  coastal 
Linder.  customs  (Ministry  of  Finance)  vassals  also participate to the  extent 
that their other duties permit. 
summary  of  inspection vessels 
Name  GRT  Length  Max.  112eed 
(knots) 
Federal government 
seefalke  1789  app.  80  Jll  20.0 
Meerkatze  1751  app.  77  Jll  15.5 
Frithjof  1637  app.  75  Jll  15.5 
warnemUnde  app.  47  m  18 
IJinder 
Nimrod  40  19.5  Jll  18 
Nixe  36  17.0  Jll  12 
Eider  140  28.0  Jll  24 
Niobe  30  17.0 Jll·  20 
Kieper  30  17.0 m  24 
Greif  40  22.0 m  16 
wacht  30  17.5 m  12 
In  addition  a  number  of  small  cust0Jil8  vessels  undertake  fiaheriea  control 
duties  in territorial waters.  The  Commission  noted that the  four  units  used 
by  the  federal  authorities  have  appropriate  equipment  for  surveillance 
missions carried out as part of inspections at. sea. 
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Air surveillance 
Fisheries  departments  may  request  airborne  aighting  information  ~rom routine 
flights made  by environmental agencies but in practice this facility is rarely 
used. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  efficiency  of  checks  carried  out  by  the  •Land•  inspection  services  is 
hampered by ataff •hortages. 
Theae  vessel•  also  provide  aaaistance  to  fiahing  vesaela,  often  outside  the 
German  economic  zone.  consequently,  at certain times  of  the  year the  limited 
range of the vessels of the  •Land•  inspection services,  which  tend to operate 
mainly in the twelve Bdle zone,  makes  it impossible to cover the entire area. 
overall,  inspections  in  Germany  are  effective,  a  situation  assiated  by  the 
considerable  reduction  in  catch  capacity.  Greater  vigilance  in thia  respect 
is now  needed  following  incorporation of  the  former  GDR  and recent  imports  of 
vessels  from other Member  states. 
./. -t,tr 
SPAJ:H 
organization of inspections 
Under  the Ministry  of Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food  the Secretariat-General 
for  Fisheries  is  responsible  far  the  application  of  community  control 
arrangements  through  a  team  of  17  full-time  inspectors  baaed  in  Madrid.  A 
further  15  inspectors  are  being  recruited.  Fisheries  inspectors  of  the 
autonomous  regional  governments  and ailitary personnel acting as  agents of the 
secretariat-General  for  Fisheries  are  authorized to carry  out  inspections  in 
ports  but  in  practice  often  give  priority  to  other  responsibilities.  One 
should  also welcome  the  new  willingness  to make  all interested parties  aware 
of  the  situation regarding minimum  sizes.  Furthermore,  one  of  the  autonomies 
(Galicia)  has  already taken major steps in this direction. 
operational responsibility  for  fisheries  surveillance  and  control at  sea lias 
with the Spanish defence  forces  (Navy). 
Summary  of  inspection vessels 
Patrol area  No.  of vessels  Length  Tonnage  speed 
(knots) 
Beyond  10  miles  9  30  to 58  m  100  to 400  15  to 30 
Out  to 60 
miles  16  9  to 14  m  5  to  21  18 
Air  surveillance 
Spain  does  not  routinely  conduct  airborne  surveillance.  Exceptionally,  the 
Air  Force  may  carry out reconnaissance missions within the  12-mile limit. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  imbalance  between  the  capacity  of  the  fleet  and  fishing  opportunities  in 
community  waters,  as  defined  in  the  Act  of  Accession,  requires  a  firm  and 
disciplined approach  from the inspection authorities.  Unfortunately,  the  lack 
of  coordination between national authorities and those at regional level makes 
this  impossible.  Bence  fishermen  do  not  generally  comply  with  technical 
measures.  Furthermore,  a  large  number  of vessels  are still fishing  without  a 
licence  in  the  waters  of  the  pre-enlargement  Community.  The  situation could 
be  improved  by  greater  cooperation  with  the  inspection  authorities  of  the 
other Kember  states. 
./. ---·-· ---------------------
ouayaide  inapection  of  veaaela  by  the  national  and  regional  autboritiea  and 
checka  on  catch••  landed  (apeciea,  quantitiea,  aizea)  are  inadequate,  aa  are 
data  entered  in  landing  declarations  and  logbooks.  This  Mana  that  catch 
atatiatica  are  unreliable,  particularly  aince  catchea  in  the  ICES  diviaion 
outaide  the  community  zone  are  often  not  charged  to  quota•  (particularly 
monkfish and megrim). 
Inapectiona  at  ••a will  have  to  await  modernization  of  the  inapection  fleet 
and  the  reallocation  of  reaponaibilitiea  between  national  and  regional 
governments. 
Cooperation with commission inspectors could be improved. 
One  of  the  major  difficulties  remains  co-ordination  between  the  different 
competent  services,  even  though  simplifications  are  being  made  at  a  national 
level. 
./. 
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organization of inspections 
The  application of community control arrangements is the responsibility of the 
Secretariat of  state  for the  sea  and  is carried out  by  the  administration of 
KaritiJIIe Af.fa.irs  (AP'MAR),  which  employs  staff in approximately  20  quartiers or 
district&  along  tbe  Atlantic  coastline  and  deals  with  a  wide  spectrum  of 
maritime  111atters  including  fisheries.  France  does  not  have  a 
specially-appointed  Fisheries  Inapectorate.  Fisheries  inspections  in  port& 
are  one  of the  surveillance tasks  ontruated to the maritime  police  {Gendarmes 
Maritimes)  under the direction of AFMAR. 
Fisheries  surveillance  and  inspection  at  sea  in  the  French  fishery  zone  are 
the  responsibility  of  the  regional  operational  surveillance  and  security 
centres  (CROSS),  which coordinate the various national resources  (AFHAR  units, 
units of the French  Navy,  customs vessels,  etc.). 
summary  of inspection vessels 
Name 
Sterne 
Grit  be 
Built 
1980 
1989 
Length  Tonnage 
49  m  350 
42  m  60 
Regional surveillance vessels 
coriandre  1974  28  m  86 
.Armoise  1968  30 m  76 
Karjolaine  1974  28  m  86 
Tourne  Pierre  1983  28  m  80 
Gab  ian  1987  32  m  80 
La Mauve  1984  32  m  80 
Air surveillance 
speed  (knots) 
17 
23 
20 
21 
23 
28 
26 
31 
The  Air  Force  claims  to  spend  about  500  flying  hours  each  year  on  maritime 
surveillance,  mainly in the Bay  of Biscay.  A large part of this time is spent 
on fisheries surveillance. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  number  of  staff  engaged  on  inspection  duties  in  the  ports  is  still 
inadequate  and  the  frequency  and  extent  of  checks  on  landings  are 
insufficient.  staff often  have  inadequate  technical  training.  Infringements 
of technical conservation measures  are not adequately prosecuted  • 
.  /. Insufficient  time  b  devoted  to the  eupervieion  of  fbhing  activity  at  aea. 
some  of the ships are old and unsuited as inspection vessels. 
The  delay in transmitting monthly catch data to the commission is unacceptable 
and  is made  still more  serious  by  the  fact  that  France  does  not  always  take 
national  measures  to  stop  fishing.  The  Commission  also  has  information 
showing that certain catch data  for  the period  1986-88  which it received  had 
been  •~~~aaaaged•  to  caapl.y  vi  th  the  quota•  available.  However,  it should  be 
noted that the fisheries •tatistics system has  been overhauled since then. 
The  fishing  industry  in  France  exerts  considerable  political  influence  and 
some  groups  have political connections which give them a  feeling that they can 
act with impunity. 
Hence,  in  some  regions  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  minimum  mesh  sizes  and  fish 
sizes  are  not  complied  with  in  the  cases  of  a  number  of  species  for  which 
market  demand  is  brisk.  In  those  ports,  a  lack  of  political  will  does  not 
encourage the inspection authorities to take action. 
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organization of inspection 
The  Department  of  the  Marine  ia  the  competent  body  reaponaible  for  the 
application  of  community  inapection  arrangements.  There  is  a  fiaheries 
inapectorate,  including  aaven  full-time  fiahery  officer•,  located  in  the 
principal landing porta. 
Fioheries  aurveillance  and  inspection•  at  aea  in  the  Iriah  fishery  zone  are 
conducted  by  the  Iriah  Naval  service  (Defence  Minhtry)  with  a  fleet  of 
vessels dedicated almost entirely to fisheries control. 
Inspection vessels 
Name 
Deirdre 
Emer 
Aisling 
Aoife 
Eithne  (with 
helicopter facilities) 
Tonnage 
1  150 
1  500 
1  500 
1  500 
2  000 
Length 
63  m 
65  m 
65  m 
65  m 
90 • 
speed  (knots) 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
There  are  also two  fast patrol vessels  purchased  in  1988,  each of  63  m length 
and capable of  27  knots. 
Air surveillance 
In  cooperation  with  the  Naval  service,  Ireland's  Air  Corps  operates  a 
fisheries  surveillance  aircraft.  A  pilot  satellite  surveillance  project, 
part-financed by  the  community,  ia beuing ••t up. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
The  ahore-based  inspection  service •uffers  from  a  lack of qualified peraonnel 
and  equipment.  Efficient utilization of  inspection ships i• hampered  by  crew 
shortages. 
Cooperation  with  other  national  inspection  aervices  (France  and  the  united 
Kingdom)  in waters  adjacent to  each other•• territories  could  be  improved  so 
that offending vee•els cannot ••cape inspection. 
The  failure  to  inspect  landings  at  ports  results  in  false  declarations, 
particularly  as  regards  catches  of  plaice  and  aole  in  the  Iriah  sea  and  of 
mackerel in the VIA  zone. 
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NETHERLANDS 
Organization of inspection 
The  Miniatry  of  ~griculture and  Fiaberi••  ia responsible  for  the  application 
of  community  control  arrangement•  throagh  a  apec~alized fisheries  inspection 
aervice  which  form8  part  of  the  General  Inspection  service  (AID).  The 
fisheries  inspectorate  is adminiatered through  three  regionally-baaed centres 
and has  approximately  180  full-time inapactors located in the porta. 
Fisheries  surveillance  and  inspection  at  sea  in  the  Dutch  fishery  zone  are 
conducted  by  Navy  minesweepers  detached  from  time to time  from  their military 
duties  and  in coastal waters  by  a  number  of  amall  patrol veaaela of the Water 
.Police. 
Vessels  used for inspection 
Royal  8avy 
5  minesweepers  (35  m,  450t,  16  knots) 
Water police 
7  patrol craft  (1984/87,  24m,  20  knota). 
Air surveillance 
There  is  no  organized  routine  airborne  surveillance  of  fisheries.  coaatguard 
aircraft,  which  may  also  carry  fisheries  inapectors,  may  pass  information  on 
sightings of fishing vessels to the inspection authorities on request. 
Principal deficiencies at present 
In recent years  the Netherlands  baa ~n  fairly  aevere meaaurea  to eliminate 
false  catch declarations  and over-fishing arising  from  the  considerable over-
capacity in the  fleet.  In moat  cases,  infringements  detected are  prosecuted. 
However,  effective  work  in the  porta  1•  undermined  by  penalties  for  offencea 
being insufficiently severe. 
Dutch  navy  veaaela  devote  insufficient  time  to  fisheries  enforcement,  which 
leaves  the  fishery  zone  outside  12  miles  unauperviaed  for  extensive  periods. 
Bence  checks  on  compliance  with  restrictions  on  the  fishing  effort  by  beam 
trawlers,  particularly the limit on  engine size,  are inadequate • 
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Deapite  the  effort•  made,  •grey•  marketing  channel•  continue  to  exiat  and 
undermine  the  reliability  of  the  catch  figure•  aent  to  the  commiaaion. 
Catches  of  pelagic  apeciea  in particular,  and  eapecially mackerel,  are  atill 
being under-reported. 
. I. - ~-
organization of inapection 
The  secretariat  General  for  Fiaheriea  in  the  Miniatry  of  Agriculture  and 
Fiaberies  is  reaponsible  for  the  application  of  community  aurveillance 
arrangements.  A  general  inapectorate  for  fiaheriea,  which  currently consiata 
of  12  inspectors,  has  been  aet  up.  staff  from  the  Miniatries  of  Finance 
(Customs)  and  Defence  (ftavy)  as well  as  from  other  Departments  take  part in 
fisheries  inspections. 
The  Portuguese  Navy  ia  reaponaible  for  fiaheriea  aurveillance  at  aea  and 
operates  a  three-tier  aystem  designed  to  cover  coaatal  fiaheriea,  the  zone 
adjacent to the  mainland  seaward&  to  40  milea  and  an  outer  zone  extending to 
200  miles together with the  fishery  zone  around the Azorea  and Madeira. 
Inspection vessels 
vessel 
10  •cacine•  class 
10  corvettes 
6  coastal vessels  * 
Built 
1964-70 
1970-75 
1960-70 
Tonnage 
app.  300 
1  200 
so 
Length  Speed  (knots) 
40  m  16 
90  m  18 
15  m  15 
The  community  has  made  a  financial contribution to the modernization of these 
vessels. 
*  Five  new  vessels will come  into service at the end of  1991. 
Air surveillance 
The  Portuguese  Air  Force  is currently refitting  two  aircraft with  up-to-date 
aurveillance  and  communications  equipment  and  intends  to  purchaae  three 
others.  Each aircraft will then be required to devote  200  flying houra  a  year 
to fisheries  surveillance. 
A  pilot  project  on  satellite  surveillance  is  being  part-financed  by  the 
community.  This  system may  be acaled up  in the light of experience  • 
.  /. - ~-
Principal deficiencies at present 
Effective  controls  in  the  porta  are  hampored  by 
responsibilities between civil and military authoritiea. 
the  division  of 
This is particularly 
true of  landings other than for auction•,  especially thoaa  from the  NAFO  zone. 
The  eetabli•hment  of  the  :Inspectorate-General  for  :riaherias  as  coordinating 
body constitutes progress  in  this  respect  but it remains  to  be  aeen  whether 
responsibilities  will  contin11e  to  be  scattered  over  a  number  of  bodies. 
Inspections at ports will have to be  stepped up. 
At  sea  the  means  currently  available  for  inspection  are  inadequate,  being 
suitable  for  use  of  fisheriea  inspections  only  in  good  weather  conditions. 
Equipment  on  the  inspection vasels  is being  modernized  and  inspection  at  sea 
should became  more  effective when  the new  vessels  come  into aervice. 
In  general,  trawler  fishermen  fail to comply  with  minimum  mesh  sizes  so  that 
under-sized fish are  landed. 
./. -.9-
URI'l'ED  ltDIGDOM 
organization of inspection 
The  Fisheries  Department  of  the  Kinhtry  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food 
(MAFF)  in England  and  Wales,  the  scottish Office's Agriculture  and  Fisheries 
Department in  scotland  (~)  and the Depart.ent of Agriculture for Northern 
Ireland  (DANI)  cooperate  in  taking  responsibility  for  the  application  of 
community surveillance arrangements. 
Each  Department  baa  its  own  sea  fisheries  inspectorate  with  a  district 
organization  which  totals  approximately  180  full-time  inspectors  located 
throughout  UK  ports. 
The  Royal  Navy  conducts  fishery  control  and  surveillance  on  behalf  of  the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food,  whilst  the  SOAFD  bas  its  own 
civilian fleet of five·patrol vessels. 
Inspection vessels 
England,  Wales  and llortheru Ireland 
6  "Island" class  FPV's 
2  •castle" class FPV's 
6  minesweepers 
Scotland 
2  FPV's 
2  FPV'a 
1  FPV 
2  inshore PV's 
Air surveillance 
Length 
60  Jll 
70  Jll 
37  Jll 
67  Jll 
53  Ill 
60  m 
20m 
Tonnage 
1  250 
1  600 
500 
1  250 
900 
580 
70 
Speed  (knots) 
16 
18 
14 
18 
16 
16 
24 
MAFF  operates  3  aircraft  dedicated  exclusively  to  fisheries  surveillance 
through  a  private aviation company. 
SOAFD  is  considering  the  purchase  of  two  twin-engined  aircraft to  take  over 
the duties hitherto carried out by  private companies. 
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Principal deficiencies at present 
The  division  of  the  exclusive  economic  zone  among  three  regional  inapection 
authorities  may  result  in  uneven  levels  of  inspection,  and  perhaps  the 
punishment of infringements,  across the united Kingdom. 
The  tendency  to  land  catches .. close  as  possible  to  the  fishing  grounds, 
sometimes  at porta which are  not permanently eupervised,  makes it hard for the 
inspection  authorities  to check  catch  declarations.  A  commission  inquiry  in 
1988  showed that records of where mackerel  had bean caught were  incomplete. 
In  general,  however,  the  united  Kingdom  baa  demonstrated  vigour  and 
efficiency.  Future  problems  may  arise  from  changes  in  fisheries  involving 
diversification  in  species  and  a  larger  number  of  landing  places.  In  recent 
years  the  united  Xingdom  has  had  to contend  with  the  regiotration of  vessels 
exported  by  other  Member  states,  which  has  posed  special inspection problems, 
particularly  compliance  with  quotas,  to which it does  not  yet  appear  to  have 
found satisfactory solutions. AMMEXE  III 
REVISED  TABLE  OF  INSPECTIONS  OF  FISHING  ACTIVITIES  CARRIED 
OUT  BY  THE  AUTHORITIES  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATES  IN  1990.  (1) 
A.  number  of inspection days spent at sea by the vessels of the 
nat1onal  control service. 
1  9  9  0 
MEMBER  STATES  NUMBER  OF  DAYS  ZONE 
375  IIIc 
GERMANY  676  IV 
14  VI 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  1.065 
'BELGIUM  I 
48  IVc 
DENMARK  69 III  an 
76  III  as 
11  I lib 
122  I lie 
57  I lid 
131  IVb 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  466 
SPAIN  872  VIII 
1.306  IX 
350  CO PACE 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  2.528 
FRANCE  253  VII 
750  VIII 
38  E.E.  GUYANE 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  1.041 
IRLAND  56  VIa 
141  VII  a 
72  VIIb 
25  VIle 
344  VIIg 
268 VIIj 
14  VIIk 
1  VIIh 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  921 
(1)  Source:  Communications  from  the member  states in 
with Regulation  (EEC)  N"  3561/85. 5b 
1  9  9  0 
MEMBER  STATES  NUMBER  OF  DAYS  ZONE 
.AND  1.346  IVb,  IVc 
PORTUGAL  1.964  IX 
299  X 
102  CECAF 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  2.365 
UNITED  KINGDOM  1.740 II,  IV 
673  VI 
770  VII 
7  VIII 
------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ total  3.190 
EEC  total  12.970 B.  Inspections of  fishing vessels carried out at sea 
!
Country in which vessels are  registFe=r=e=d~===v==~l 
_BEL  oEu  joNK  jEsP  FRA  IRE  NLD=  PRT  IGBR  OTH 
1  - Total 
vessels 
inspected 
at sea 
by  ICES/NAFO/ 
CECAF  areas 
area 
II 
Ill 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
CO PACE 
ZEE  GUY 
Total  number  of vessels 
committing an offence 
2  - TOTAL  number of 
offences at sea 
reported in the 
following sectors: 
- logbook  and/or  (T) 
landing  (A) 
declaration  (S) 
- illegal gear 
(R) 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
- fishing prohibited 
because  of 
* close area 
* excessive 
engine power 
or tonnage 
excessive 
T  =  TOTAL 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
0 
11 
454 
0 
0 
117 
62 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
14 
8 
0 
6 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
A = OFFICIAL  WRITTEN  WARNINGS 
S  = ADMINISTRATIVE  PENALTIES 
0 
55 
377 
0 
5 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
49 
5 
5 
0 
0 
12 
5 
1 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R = INFRIGEMENTS  BROUGHT  TO  COURT 
0 
378 
445 
0 
2 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
96 
274 
1083 
797 
22 
182 
0 
2 
0 
166 
0 
173 
1507 
920 
0 
0 
0 
208 
0 
0 
5 
0 
50 
197 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2850 
0 
18 
34 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
3 
7103 
235 
4 
0 
50  541  318  17  93  1172 
10 
5 
0 
5 
12 
0 
0 
12 
9 
0 
0 
9 
5 
1 
0 
4 
73 
7 
45 
8 
28 
11 
0 
16 
4 
1 
0 
1 
16 
4 
0 
10 
3
~oo
1
u~  29  0  5 
9  1  21 
49  110 
0  21 
30  0 
18  89 
1  0 
0  0 
0  0 
1  0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
1 
0 
18 
10 
3 
0 
7 
9 
3 
2 
0 
111 
28 
27 
1 
49 
0 
16 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1322 
0 
483 
479 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
95 
58 
19 
0 
35 
13 
6 
0 
6 
4 
0 
0 
4 
5 
2 
0 
3 
3 
12 
139 
0 
124 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
106 
13 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 country in which vessels 
lsEL I 
- illegal catch 
resulting from 
* directed  (T) 
fishery  (A) 
(S) 
(R) 
* by-catch 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
*  undersized fish 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
- unauthorised 
fishery 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
- marking gear 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
- marking  and 
identification 
of vessel 
(T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
- others  (T) 
(A) 
(S) 
(R) 
T  =  TOTAL 
A = OFFICIAL  WRITTEN  WARNINGS 
S  = ADMINISTRATIVE  PENALTIES 
3 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
6 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
0 
0 
6 
3 
0 
3 
DEU 
R = INFRIGEMENTS  BROUGHT  TO  COURT 
DNK  ESP  FRA 
0  10  2  0 
0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
0  10  0  0 
0  5  4  0 
0  0  1  0 
0  0  2  0 
0  5  1  0 
5  0  24  50 
5  0  0  14 
0  0  7  0 
0  0  6  36 
2  3  108  1 
1  0  0  0 
1  3  56  0 
0  0  29  1 
2  0  25  19 
2  0  0  0 
0  0  10  0 
0  0  14  18 
0  4  28  5 
0  3  1  0 
0  0  8  0 
0  1  12  5 
1  9  226 [j 
0  2  2 
1  3  193 
0  4  19  9 
are registered 
IRE  NLD  PRT  IGBR  OTH 
5  2  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  0  1  0 
0  0  0  1  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
4  13  10  15  0 
1  7  0  3  0 
0  2  3  0  0 
1  1  0  10  0 
4  0  227  10  13 
0  0  133  0  0 
0  0  17  0  0 
0  0  0  0  13 
2  1  387  1  0 
0  0  315  0  0 
0  0  18  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
2  1  60  3  0 
0  0  48  0  0 
0  0  3  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
2  1  315 [j 
0 
0  1  161  0 
0  0  30  0 
0  0  0  0 c.  Offences discovered in port 
Country in which vessels 
BEL 
Total  number  of 
offences reported 
- Logbook  and/or  (T)  27 
landing  (A)  20 
declaration  (S)  0 
·,  (R)  7 
I 
- Illegal  (T)  1 
gear  (A)  0 
(S)  0 
(R)  1 
- fishing prohibited 
because of: 
* closed area  (T)  2 
. (A)  0 
(S)  0 
(R)  2 
* excessive  (T)  0 
engine  power  (A)  0 
or tonnage  (S)  0 
(R)  0 
- Illegal catch 
resulting from: 
* directe  (T)  1 
fishery  (A)  0 
(S)  0 
(R)  1 
* by-catch 
(T}  1 
(A)  0 
(5)  0 
(R)  1 
T = TOTAL 
A = OFFICIAL  WRITTEN  WARNINGS 
5  = ADMINISTRATIVE  PENALTIES 
DEU 
35 
15 
9 
7 
5 
1 
1 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R = INFRIGEMENTS  BROUGHT  TO  COURT 
DNK  [ESP  FRA 
280  64  18 
166  0  5 
21  52  0 
93  12  13 
5  5  22 
0  0  17 
0  3  0 
5  2  4 
6  5  24 
0  0  14 
0  4  0 
6  0  10 
0  0  2 
0  0  1 
0  0  1 
0  0  0 
9  0  0 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
9  0  0 
40  11  0 
0  1  0 
0  10  0 
40  0  0 
are registered 
IRE  INLD  I  PRT  GBR  OTH 
0  529  3  346  4 
0  11  0  287  1 
0  0  1  0  0 
0  518  0  59  1 
0  46  94  5  1 
0  4  0  3  0 
0  0  46  0  0 
0  42  1  2  1 
0  0  104  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  43  0  0 
0  0  1  0  0 
0  2  5  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  2  0  0  0 
0  99  2  1  0 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  98  0  1  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0 bO 
Country in which vessels are registered 
BEL  I  DEU JaE  I  FRA  II IRE I  NLD  f.t'K'J.'  I  GBR  I  OTH 
*  undersized fish 
(T)  7  18  38  4  113  0  81  22  128  0 
(A)  5  6  0  0  19  0  6  0  91  0 
(S)  0  7  0  2  3  0  0  3  0  0 
(R)  2  5  38  1  91  0  75  0  37  0 
- unauthorized 
fishery 
(T)  0  6  5  23  0  2  11  69  0  0 
(A)  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
(S)  0  2  2  19  0  0  1  35  0  0 
(R)  0  0  3  4  0  1  10  0  0  0 
- marking  gear 
(T)  0  1  8  6  54  0  0  6  0  9 
(A)  0  1  6  0  52  0  0  0  0  9 
(S)  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  4  0  0 
(R)  0  0  2  5  1  0  0  0  0  0 
- marking  and 
identification 
of vessel 
( T)  10  0  0  3  30  0  10  6  0  0 
(A)  10  0  0  0  0  0  7  0  0  0 
(S)  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  4  0  0 
(R)  0  0  0  0  30  0  3  0  0  0 
- others  (T)  25 
[][][][][][]~[][] 
(A)  24 
(S)  0  0  50  0  0  0  112  0  0 
(R)  1  0  0  16  0  0  0  0  0 
T  = TOTAL 
A  = OFFICIAL  WRITTEN  WARNINGS 
S  = ADMINISTRATIVE  PENALTIES 
R  =  INFRIGEMENTS  BROUGHT  TO  COURT ANNEX  III - biB 
YEAR 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
INSPECTIONS  CARRIED  OUT  BY 
COMMUNITY  STAFF 
BUHBD OF  DAYS  NUMBER  OF 
OF  INSPECTIONS  IftSPECTORS 
IN  SERVICE 
402  11 
1  126  13 
1  266  14 
1  590  15 
1  784  15 
1  401  15 
1  555  191 
1  Including two  who  joined in October  1991. 
NUMBER  OF  TOURS 
OF  DUTY 
52 
65 
53 
68  +  4  NAFO 
66  +  4  NAFO 
58  +  6  NAFO 
42  +  10  NAFO TRANSMISSION  OF  CATCH  DATAl 
Delays in transmission 
Number  of days  delay 
(average) 
Member  states 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Germany  6.5  1  1.5  0  0 
Belgium  0  1  1.5  0  0 
Denmark  4  9  4.5  4.5  5 
spain2  41  17  6.5  3  1 
France3  12  20.5  26.5  37  134 
Ireland  7  8  6  8  9 
Netherlands  1.5  3.5  2  0  0 
Portugal  1.5  9  7.5  10  8 
United Kingdom  7  5.5  2.5  1  1 
1  Article 9(2)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  2241/87 of 23  July  1987  requires 
each Kember  state to inform the commission,  before the  15th of each 
month,  of the quantities of each stock or group of stocks  subject to 
TACs  or quotas  landed during the  preceding month. 
2  The  commission  began  infringement proceedings  in 1987.  In view of the 
considerable reduction in delays  in transmission,  these were  suspended 
in  1989. 
3  The  Commission  decided to initiate infringement proceedings  en 
31  January  1990. 
4  The  situation regarding delays  in receipt has  improved since June  1991. USE  OF  SATELLITE  TECHNOLOGY 
FOR  FISHING  SURVEILLANCE 
ANNEX  V 
1.  Given  the extent of the areas that need to be  monitored  and the  fact that 
the  vessels  fishing  there  are  spread cut ever  a  wide  expanse,  the  checks 
carried out by  Kamber  states  using  conventional  sea- and  air-baaed  means 
are  necessarily limited in scope,  fragmentary,  irregular  and difficult to 
coordinate.  Fer  example,  they  are  quite  inadequate  to  check  the 
declarations made  at sea by masters en catch sites and dates. 
Unless  one  is  prepared  to  coznmi t  the  very  considerable  resources,  at 
prohibitive cost,  that would  be  required  to  use  just conventional  means, 
the  possibility  of  using  new  technologies  to  improve  the  level  of 
monitoring must be  considered.  such new  technologies,  based on the use of 
satellites,  should  make  it possible  net  only  to make  the  surveillance  of 
fishing  activities  by  fishing  vessels  mere  efficient but  also  to  improve 
vessel  safety  and  management  for  fishermen  and  owners  alike.  The  use  of 
satellites would  obviously not remove  the  need to carry cut inspections at 
sea  and  checks  en  landings,  but  could reduce  the coat of  such  inspections 
or make  them more  coat-effective. 
2.  In  1988  DG  XIV  commissioned  an  exploratory  study  en  r&JIICte  methods  of 
direct,  automatic vessel identification and location,  including the extent 
to which it would  be  possible to establish the nature  of their activities 
and to communicate with them. 
The  study,  which  was  contracted  cut  to  an  independent  consultant, 
concluded that it was  technically possible to introduce  ever the next  few 
years  automatic  surveillance  systems  that  would  involve  fitting  fishing 
vessels  with  tamperproof  beacons  ( •blue  boxes•)  and  setting  up 
computerized ground control stations.  The  study recommended  combining the 
GPS  position-finding system and the  INMARSAT  communication systems • 
. I. -Ut-
3.  Portugal  has  begun  work  on  an  experimental project involving  an  automatic 
surveillance  system;  this  project  receives  a  community  financial 
contribution  under  council Decision  87/278/EEC  of  18  Hay  1987  on  the 
development  of  the  monitoring  and  aupervhion  facilities  of  the  Member 
states.  The  project is entitled MONICAP  and is baaed on  combining GPS  and 
INMARSAT. 
In  the  first  phase,  MONICAP  covers  only  Portuguese  vessels  fishing  in 
Portuguese  vatera.  It  is  intended  to  link  it  up  with  the  broader 
organizational plan for the management of all Portuguese fisheries. 
Tests of the HONICAP  system carried out using  a  scientific research vessel 
and  a  number  of fishing vessels equipped with  beacons  have  given positive 
results. 
4.  The  Commission  wishes  to  promote  the  use  of  such  new  techniques  in  the 
community,  to  the  extent  that  they  may  help  make  surveillance  more 
effective.  The  Vice-President  of  the  commission,  Hr Marin,  has  expressed 
this view on  numerous  occasions. 
The  Commission  wishes  to  see  these  new  automatic  surveillance  systems 
integrated within  a  community  structure  that would  permit  expansion  in  a 
harmonious  manner,  avoid  problems  of  technical  incompatibility  and  give 
the best results at the  lowest coat. 
A  study  along  these  lines  has  been  carried  out  under  the  joint 
responsibility  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Fisheries  (DG  XIV)  and  the 
Directorate-General  for  Telecommunications,  Information  Industries  and 
Innovation  (DG  XIII).  This  study  is  baaed  on  the  results  of  the 
Portuguese pilot scheme. 
The  specific  aim  of  the  study  is  to  provide  the  Member  states  and  the 
commission  with  information  on  the  various  options  and  costs  of  a 
Community-wide,  satellite-based  automatic  surveillance  system  of  fishing 
vessels for the purpose of applying the provisions of the  common  fisheries 
policy as  regards conservation and monitoring. 
./. The  ideal system should enablaz 
the position of fiahing vessola to be pinpointed at any  given timeJ 
data  to  be  processed  either  in  a  community  centra  or  in  national 
centres,  or in a  hybrid structure; 
information to be  provided  such  that Member  States  may  monitor  fishing 
vessels  in  their  watera  whatever  flag  they  fly  and  locate  their  own 
vessels wherever they may  be. 
The  commission  could  be  included  in  the  11yatem  in  a  way  enabling  it to 
assume  a  role  akin  to  that  of  a  coastal  state  for  non-member  country 
vessels  fishing  in  community  waters  and  of  flag  state  for  community 
vessels fishing  in waters  covered by international agreements. 
s.  The  commission  has  requested  the  assistance  of  the  surveillance  and 
enforcement  authorities  in  all  Member  states  in  pursuing  the  above-
mentioned  study.  The  authorities  concerned  have  held initial discussions 
with the commission  and have  seen a  practical demonstration of the  MONICAP 
system  in  operation;  in  addition,  the  results  of  the  study  have  baan 
presented  to  the  national  authorities.  However,  whilst  expressing 
interest  in  cooperating  in  the  commission  study,  almost  all  national 
representatives  evinced  considerable  wariness  about  the  possibilities  of 
future  expansion  given  the  political  and  legal  constraints  that  applied 
and  the considerable uncertainty as  regards  the cost/benefit ratio. 
Ireland  nevertheless  stated that it could  install  a  number  of  beacons  on 
fishing vessels on an experimental basis. 
./. A  resum6  of  the  conclusion•  of  the  study,  with  an  eGtimate  of  the  costs, 
is attached.  It aeems  that,  according  to the  aygtQM  architecture  choaen, 
the coats could rise to 1,600 to 2,400 zcu  per vaaael per year.  The total 
coats  of the  mys~em,  calculated over  a  pariod of  5  yoars,  can vary,  again 
according  to  the  architecture  cho•an,  for  a  flmet  of  10,000  vesuela 
between  84  and  122  KECU  or,  for  a  fleet of  30,000 vesoelm,  bet~ean 240  and 
319  MECU.  on  an  annual  basis,  theae  costs  only  r~present  a  small 
percentage of the value of  landed producta. 
6.  since  establishment  of  an  integrated  aurveillanco  oyctem  encompassing 
vesselo,  satellite  and  one  or more  national  or  Community  control  centres 
will  take  a  number  o~  years,  the  Commission  has  ordered  a  computer 
simulation  of  the  system which  could  be  tested in the  near  future  on  the 
data  derived  from  the  MONICAP  project.  The  experionce  acquired  could  be 
used to create  a  Community architecture. • 
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·summary of  conclusions·  .. ·.· 
The main conclusions of  this s~~y  ~,  b~  summari~ed as follows: 
l  It would  be technically  feaSible,:~  to  establish an  integrated' .salellile  .. based 
fi~heries monitoring .systemofthe ~ind envisaged in the 1990 Communication 
from the Comnus.sion concerning tbe Comn1on Fisheries Policy.· 
The overall concept of the .system could be realbed ln a number' of ways, the 
main options being with respecl to the capabilities of the onoboard position 
reporting terminals. the degree of centralization (if any) of land-based daaa 
processing functions. the implementation, or not, of interactive monitoring 
facilities  us~ng graphical  workstations (in addition to automatic analysis of 
duta), Md whether or not custom software development would be ·undertaken 
by aU  participating Member States on a shared basis. 
' 
2  The system can be based on existing 5ate1lhe services, the most appropriaLe 
being  the  US  Global  Positioning  System  (GPS)  and  the  jnternationat 
lnmarsat·C mobile communication service. 
3  New legislation would probably be required in most Member States to provide 
for the mandatory fitting of position reponing tenninals on relevant vessels. 
4  The data processing subsystem could be built around a commercial database 
product and, if an interactive monitoring facility is incorporated, a Graphical 
lnfonnation System  (GIS) product. Substantial ac1ditional  custom software 
development • however, would also be ~uired. 
The requirements for distribution or data between the sites involved in the 
system could readily be mel by existing terrestrial communication services. 
The total costs associated wilh the proposed system would be around 1,600-
2.400 ECU per annum for each vessel included in the system, depending on the 
options chosen. With 10,000 vessels.  for example, the total costs over 5 years 
would be around 85-120 million ECU. 
nle main benefits of the system would be that 
•  it would improve the efficiency of fisheries monitoring by identifying 
probable infringements of fishing regulations and providing the relevant 
details to nadona1 enforcement authoritiesh who would, consequently, be 
able to optimize the deployment of inspection vessels and  surveillance 
aircraft 
•  the very presence of the system would probably act, to some extent, as a 
deterrent against fishermen committing infringements 
•  . il wou1d allow improved conservation tools to be developed. 
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1  The :system'~ role would be tq::.cumplemena  in!ditionul motHtorJng  methods 
nu.her than to replace thern, for  U1~ following ma.lu reasons:  · 
6)  !he sys~em would only ~  capable of  monitorin& compliance with certain 
types of reguladon. munel)' those which relate to vessels_ of particular 
flags and types 8 fishing in eeru.in geographical a.reas at cenain times (u 
distinct from regulations eoneemed wlth particular fish species or mesh 
dzer;;} 
h would not be capabl~ of providing oonclu~iv~ proof that a vessel wa5 
.f"uhing in a fort.>.idden Mea; physical in$pectlon would still be requlrtd tO 
olnam $~Jch proof 
it  is !!.mUke!y uuu ill  vessels fishing in EC waters would be included in 
ilie sy~~e;m  .. 
The concept of the proposed system could be tested by implementing an !nitial 
5m:ti.!1cscaile pilox system wilh 8  for example. only a CBC·operated centre for 
monhoring third-country vessels licensed to fhh in EC waters e.nd EC vessels 
Hcensed to fish in third country water5. esc  riShcrics monlcorins IKUdy 
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Cost estimates 
The total estimated 5-year costs of the three sub~;ystems (da&a retrieval, processing 
and distribution) are summarized in the mblcs below. The csl.imates are based on the 
participation of 9 Member States In me proposed system, namely lhose affected by 
!he ~:  Belgium, Denmark, Prance. Oennany, ~land, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK. The data processing costs would VIU)' from one Member State co 
another, because of differences ln fleet sizes, loc;al hardware prioea, etc. We do not 
believe, however, lhat such differences would be signiflCBDlln relation to the overall 
magnitudes of the costs and, consequently, we have 11.11sumcd the same estimates for 
each country. 
Numbers of  vessels 
10,000  20,000  30,000 
With basic lemlinals  78  1S6  234 
With enhanced terminals  98  196  294 
Total Sayear data retrieval costs (million ECU) 
WllhoUI inleractlve  With Interactive 
monitorl~  monltorln_g 
DistribuJed!Despokc  13.9  22.5 
Hybrld!Be.tpou  14.5  23.1 
Cen.tralized!Bespou  4.9  . 
Distributed/Shared  6.8  13.3 
Hybrid/Shared  7.4  13.9 
Total S-)'ear drala processing c:osts  (million ECU) 
Numbers of  vessels 
/0_1_000  20,000  30,000 
Distributed  o.s  0.8  1.1 
Hybrid  1.0  l.S  l.S 
Centralized  0.9  1.5  l.S 
Total 5 -year data distribution costs (million ECU) 
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The following uble shows the total !S·ycar costs of ihc whole monitoring sys\Cill, 
assuming the following: 
•  basic position reponing tenniruils (ie, without data enuy units and printers) 
•  no interacdve monitoring facilities at PMCs 
•  shared software development (whece possible, ie, in Lhe distributed ln hybrid 
system architecture options). 
This is the lowest cost combination of  the basic options. 
Numbt.rs ojve.ssels 
10,000  20,000  30,000 
Distributed  85  164  242 
Hybrid  86  16S  243 
Cenrralizod  84  162  240 
Total S ..  ,.~r  costs of whole system (million ECU) • basic 
termlnais, no ba!eractlve monitoring, Ghared development 
'nte most expensive combination of  options is as follows: 
..  enhanced position reponing tenninals (wh.h da1a entry units and printers) 
o  with interactive monitoring facilities (distributed and hybrid options only) 
•  bespoke software development. 
The corresponding total 5-year costs are as follows; 
Numbers of  vessels 
10,000  20,000  30lXJO 
Distributed  121  219  318 
Hybrid  122  221  319 
Centralized"'  104  202  300 
o  without intetaetlve monitoring 
Tol.at S •)'ear costs of  whole system (miiUon ECU) • enhanced 
terminals, with Interactive monitoring, bespoke development 
8. • 
A.  MAXIMUM  FINES  UNDER  NATIONAL  LEGISLATION  FOR  CERTAIN  INFRINGEMENTS  CONCERNING  SEA  FISHERIES  (in ecus)  (1) 
NATURE  OF  INFII~GEMENT  8  DK  (2)  D  E  F 
1.  Failure to cooperate with  fisheries  75.664  3.167  (3)  78.493  71.642 
inspectors 
2.  Infringement  of  provisions concerning  75.664  3.167  72.963  78.493  716 
logbooks,  and  declarations of  landings  and 
transhipments 
3. Unauthorized fishing (no  quota)  75.664  30  X  72.963  31.397  71.642 
4. Unauthorized fishing (no  licence)  75.664  30  X  72.963  31.397  71.642 
5.  Fishing with  uneuthorized gear  75.664  30  X  72.963  31.397  21.493 
6. Keeping  undersized fish on  board  75.664  30  X  72.963  31.397  21.493 
~-
B.  FINES  IN  THE  MEMBER  STATES  FOR  CERTAIN  INFRINGEMENTS  (in ecus)  (1) 
~ATURE Of  INFRINGEMENT  8  DIC  (2)  D  E  F 
1.  Failure to cooperate with  fisheries  236  •  1.418  (3)  4.864  •  9.ns  78.493  7.164  - 71.642 
inspectors 
2.  Infringement  of provlafons concerning  236  •  1.418  - 127  - 2.432  7.849  - 716 
logbooks,  and  declarations of  landings 
and  transhf~ts 
3. Unauthorized fishing (no quota)  236  - 1.418  25  X •  30  X  4.864  - 9.ns  31.397  7.164  - 71.642 
(6)  (6) 
4.  Unauthorized fishing (no  l fcence)  236  •  1.418  25  X •  30  X  9.728  •  17.025  31.397  7.164  - 71.642 
(6)  (6) 
5.  Fishing with  unauthorized gear  236  - 1.418  (5)  4.864  - 9.na  31.397  430  - 21.493 
(6)  (6) 
6. Keeping  undersized fish on  board  236  - 1.418  •  30  X  2.432  - 9.na  31.397  430  •  21.493 
(6)  (6) 
'-
(11  8CU  ~oto  fo~ 3aae lttl. 
.. 
Ill  IL 
130.141  (3) 
130.141  10.792 
130.141  10.192 
130.141  10.792 
130.141  10.792 
130.141  10.792 
I  IlL  tiL 
104.113  4-317 
(6)  (6) 
50.755  4.317 
(6) 
171.136  &.317 
(6)  (6) 
171.136  4.317 
(6)  (6) 
139.955  4.317 
(6)  (6) 
156.170  4.317 
(6)  (6) 
A I  I  E X E  V I 
PT  UK 
(3)  7.168 
1.393  2.867 
11.145  71.679 
27.860  71.679 
11.145  7.168 
3.344  2.867 
PT  UIC 
(3)  .  717  . 
1.393  717  •  2.867 
11.145  2.867  •  8.601 
(6)  (6) 
27.860  13.619  - 64.511 
(6) 
11.145  2.867  - 7.168 
(5)  (5) 
3.344  717  - 2.867 
(6)  (6) 
...e-4 
> 
(31  Piaoo  datar.iaed  oo  a  pa~aata  .. var,iat witb tba  oarioa•Daao of  tba  iaf~ia9a  ..  at,  tbo  aa~kat •alae of tba ootab  o~ tba  p~opo~tioa ia  ooat~o•oatioa (oa  oaob  oooooioa  tba  aarkat ••lao of  tba 
ootob  io aotifiad to  tbo Niaiotry of Fiobori••l· 
(JJ  c~i  .. aado~ ordiaorr 1••· 
(IJ  ~tal fiaoo. 
(51  l ...  diato  eoiaa~• of illioit t••r. 
1•1  catobao  aDd ...  r  ••r  be  oaiaed. 
•oaroeoo  ••tioaol latiolotioa. 